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I. INTRODUCTION
With Pilate reputed to have asked, "What is truth?" and then to have
departed without waiting for an answer,' perhaps it is foolhardy to ven-
ture into the ramifications of fraud, whether in franchising or elsewhere.
Yet the rapid erosion of the defense of "seller's talk" and the accentu-
ation of all consumers' rights demand clarification of the evolving stan-
dards, with intense probing of the various factual categories of fraud in
franchising itself. It is, of course, unnecessary to endorse the univer-
sally expressed view that the courts will not define fraud lest the ingenu-
ity of man be employed to circumvent it.' Instead, such underlying
principles might appear to justify the view that the benefit of any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the innocent party.3
Although the franchise method of market distribution is not new, its
ramifications have only recently been coming into focus, with consider-
able ignorance and debate still prevalent. With several studies staunchly
supporting the validity of franchising,4 Congressional inquiry has dis-
closed sharp criticism of such glowing accounts and decried the lack of
reliable statistics. 5  Studies sponsored by industry" and governmente have
eember of Massachusetts Bar.
'F. BACON, Essay on Truth, in I BACON'S WORKS 261 (1846). See Fletcher, Fal est and
Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L REV. 537 (1972).
2 See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972), where the Court quoted with
approval the House Conference Report on the original FTC Act regarding the impossibility
of defining unfair practices, "[t]here is no limit to human inventiveness in this field. Even if all
known unfair practices were specifically defined and prohibited, it would be at once necessary to
begin over again ... it would [be] ... an endless task." Id. at 240, quoting H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1914).
3 Rigor v. Bucci, 245 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1971). As to fraud in sale of a franchise, cases requir-
ing " 'clear and convincing evidence,' or requiring any quantum of proof other than a prepon.
derance or greater weight of the evidence, are hereby overruled." Id. at 53.
4 See J. ATKINSON, FRANCHISING: THE ODDS-ON FAVORITE (1968); H. KURsH, THE
FRANCHISE Boom (new rev. ed. 1968); R. ROSENBERG & lML BEDELL, PROFITS FROM FRAN-
CI'SNG (1969); C. VAUGHN, FRANCHISING TODAY (1970); R. METz, FRANCHISING: How To
SELECT A BUSINESS OF YOUR OwN (1969).
5 See Hearing on the Impact of Franchising on Small Business Before the Subcommittee on
Urban and Rural Economic Development of the Select Committee on Small Builness, S.
REP. No. 91-13 4 4 , 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Hearings]. For
this authors criticism of J. ATKINSON, supra note 4, see 1970 Hearings at 3-4. The Atkinson
text is set out in full in 1970 Hearings at 57-110. Atkinson's response to the author's criticism
is set out in 1970 Hearings at 49,52. For this author's critical review of KIzT, supra note 4, see
1970 Hearings at 43-48, concluding that the "credibility gap" between the facts and the reports
was so tremendous that the FTC might well charge the franchisors with "deceptive acts or
practices under section 5 of the Act."6 See "Franchised Distribution" (Conference Board, 1971).
7 See U. OZANNE & S. HUNT, ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FRANCHISING (1971). This study,
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hurriedly been assembled to fill this breach, but the sharp differences in
their conclusions would appear to indicate that resolution is still distant.
Yet a fair understanding of fraud in franchising must commence with
an analysis of the relationship at the factual, social, and economic levels.
In that inquiry, it will be necessary to examine recent developments
in franchising as well as to probe the abuses and opportunities for abuse
so rampant in this marketing method. Although the scope of such an
undertaking could make the effort frustrating, it would otherwise be im-
possible to comprehend the significance of both misrepresentation and
concealment in this complex business arrangement, as well as the evolu-
tion of their legal limits, in order to meet these novel challenges. As will
be seen, the law has not been insensitive to such developments, both in
the area of common law as well as in state and federal enactments.,
'While this discussion will focus on franchising, much of it is clearly ap-
plicable to all business transactions, perhaps reflecting a growing ac-
knowledgment that sellers must stand responsible for the accuracy of all
representations, 9 that buyers must be assured the full benefit of their bar-
gain," and that national standards are necessary in a country of such re-
markable mobility.1
In resolving such issues of sophisticated fraud, much stress must be
laid on the marked imbalance in the relationship of the parties as well as
the severity of the franchisee's reliance on the franchisor. 12  Both of these
factors were accentuated by the president of the leading chicken fran-
chisor in his Congressional testimony that:
This emotional dream, the desire of every American to own his own busi-
ness, to be his own boss, has many pitfalls. He is easy prey for the
hot-shot promoter because the stakes are so high here. These small
businessmen very often scrape up every dime they can borrow, beg or
sponsored by the Small Business Administration, included a recommendation that the Inter-
national Franchising Association [hereinafter cited as IFA] withdraw from circulation all copies
of ATIJNSON, supra note 4, on the grounds that, "The book presents grossly inaccurate data on
[franchise] failure rates and would be very misleading to potential franchisees." Id. at 237.
See also U.S DEPT. op CoM., FRANCHISING IN THE ECONOMY 1969-1971 (1971), which is
a statistical analysis based exclusively on reports submitted by franchisors, with no independent
verification.
8 See text accompanying note 211 infra; Brown, Franchising: Realities and Remedies,
N.Y.L.J. - (1972).
9 See Wall Street J., Jan. 21, 1972, at 1, col. 6; Note, "Corrective Advertising" Orders of the
Federal Trade Commission, 85 HARv. L. Rnv. 477 (1971).
10 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). See also Con-
sumer Health and Safety, 8 TRIAL 16 (Jan.-Feb., 1972) at 6.
11 See Newberg, Federal Consumer Class Actiop Legislation: Making the System Work,
9 HARv. J. LEGIS. 217 (1972).
12 See H. BRowN, FRANCHISING: TRAP FOR THE TRUSTING 41 (1969, Supp. 1970), not-
ing that in advertising for the potential franchisee with "no experience required," such disparity
is intentionally fostered by franchisors; Rosenfield, Franchising and the Lawyer, 42 FLA. B.J. 17
(1968), conduding that if the franchisor "is willing to give away any part of its basic contract
it can only indicate a fatal weakness in the structure and philosophy of the company." Id. at 22.
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steal in a lifetime of earnings, and put it all on one dream and hope of
a franchise concept that very likely could have been misleading and
misrepresentative and fraudulent. For that reason I think that the Sen-
ate, the Government of this country, should take some positive action
to protect the small businessman. After all, he is the one that is going
to get hurt, not the franchisor, because the franchisee is the one who
puts up all the money and all the labor, in order to develop that busi-
ness concept.13
Indeed, the extent of such overreaching has been conceded by the former
general counsel of another fast-food franchisor, reporting that the in-
dustry "grossly oversold itself with promotions that were designed to
work on the unrealistic hopes and daydreams of the naive..." leading to
a "'boom' [that] was built on the desire for a fast buck, slid promo-
tion and the American myth of Horatio Alger.. ."14
Such concessions by prominent spokesmen for the franchise move-
ment might appear to indicate the lack of any need to belabor the issue
of fraud, its prevalence being a matter of common knowledge. Unfor-
tunately, such admissions are only directed toward malfeasance at the
surface, with no inclination to go to the roots of the problem. Further,
given the extremely broad scope of the functions in franchising, it will be
demonstrated that even stretching the classical common law rules to
their limit, statutory relief will still be required. A full exposition of the
areas of abuse may provide guideposts for the creation of such new regu-
lations.
33 Statement of John Y. Brown, Jr., while President of Kentucky Fried Chid:en, given Jan.
20, 1970, before the Select Committee on Small Business, 1970 Hcarings, supra note 5, at 190.
See Weaver v. American Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144 (Ind. App. 1971), where the exoneration
clause in the oil company's dealership contract was held unenforceable because of unconsion-
ability based on disparity of parties. Justice Frankfurter commented on this problem by ask-
ing:
Does any principle in our law have more universal application than the doctrine
that courts will not enforce transactions in which the relative positions of the parties
are such that one has unconscionably taken advantage of the necessities of the other?
. . . The law is not so primitive that it sanctions every injustice except brute
force and downright fraud. More specifically, the courts generally refuse to lend
themselves to the enforcement of a "bargain" in which one party has unjustly taken
advantage of the economic necessities of the other.
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 326 (1942) (dissenting opinion). See
Comment, Conscionability and the Freedom to Contract, 22 BAYLoR L REv-. 99 (1970), par-
ticularly discussion of Prince v. Miller Brewing Co., 434 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
See also Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
For the most progressive franchise decision to date, see opinion of Judge J. Gelman (tempo-
rarily assigned) in Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, (N.J., Superior Court for Bergen County, Law No.
L. 31431-71 and Chancery No. C. 3094-71, decided July 21, 1972) 1972 T.C. 5 74,178, holding
unconscionable the oil company's termination of a gasoline station dealership and the attempted
eviction of the dealer under the intimately related sublease. Stressing the possible forfeiture of
the dealer's goodwill, the onesided offer of contract renewals on a take-it.or-leave-it basis, the
public policy implications of legislative renewal requirements in the absence of good cause, and
the unclean hands emanating from both federal and state antitrust violations, the courts not only
rejected the oil company's claims, but also ordered reformation of the contract of adhesion.
14 Corliss, Franchising: Time for a New Beginning? The Law r's Responsibiity, 15
BosToN BJ. 7, 13 (1971).
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I. FACTUAL AND EcoNoMIc ANALYSIS
A. Capital Matters
The threshhold question involves inquiry as to the very product being
offered when a franchise is granted. Regrettably, the only clearly appli-
cable legal definition derives from the requirement of the Lanham Act "
that the licensor of a trademark must exercise quality control over its
use by the licensee or suffer the risk of its loss.' Yet aside from the ex-
press provision of that statute that antitrust violations are not thereby
condoned,17 no one has seriously suggested that the perimeters of a fran-
chise should be determined by a nonpreemptive federal statute primarily
concerned with trademark law and the risks of passing off one's property
as that of another. 8 To the contrary, as with other business entities such
as corporations, business trusts, partnerships, joint ventures or propri-
etorships, it should be anticipated that state law would control. In the
face of an almost total absence of applicable common law or statutory
regulation, the prevailing view has been but to apply the simple rules of
fraud in the inducement or contract precepts,' 9 leaving trade regulation
15 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1970).
16Lanham Act §§ 5, 14, 45, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1055, 1061(e) (1), 1127 (1970);
E. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Celanese Corp., 167 F.2d 484 (C.C.P.A. 1948); Morse-
Starrett Products Co. v. Steccone, 86 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1949).
17 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (b)(7) (1970). See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341
U.S. 593 (1951); Phi Delta Them Fraternity v. J. A. Buchroeder & Co., 251 F. Supp. 968
(W.D. Mo. 1966). See also Developments in the Law, Trade Afarks and Unfair Competition,
68 HARV. L REV. 814, 816-19, 895-906 (1955); Note, Quality Control and the Antitrst
Laws in Trademark Licensing, 72 YALE L.J. 1171, 1181-82 (1963); Collison, Trademarks
-The Cornerstone of a Franchise System, 24 Sw. L.J. 247 (1970).
18 It may be appropriate to reexamine the standards supposedly imposed upon franchising
by the Lanham Act. In actuality, that statute merely prescribes that a trademark shall be can.
celled if the registrant "does not control, or is not able legitimately to exercise control over,
the use of such mark," 15 U.S.C. § 1064(e)(1), a provision quite different from a "require-
ment" that the franchisor exercise quality control over its licensee. Such a conditional cancel-
lation may tolerate a privilege, but as in every other instance, the use of excessive power should
result in the loss of the privilege. Furthermore, there may be some question as to the admin-
istrative zeal of the Patent Office to enforce the cancellation standards. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord,
456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976 (1972). (With regard to patent cancel.
lation, see remarks of district court recommending that the Department of Justice invsti-
gate the Patent Office, characterized as "the sickest institution that our Government has ever
invented" and "the weakest link in the competitive system in America," Id. at 542). As the
Supreme Court has recently commented on the abuse employment of a trademark, or any
other right:
Even constitutionally protected property rights such as patents may not be used as
levers for obtaining objectives proscribed by the antitrust laws....
The trademark may become a detrimental weapon if it is used to serve a harmful
or injurious purpose. If it becomes a tool to circumvent free enterprise and un-
bridled competition, public policy dictates that the rights enjoyed by its ownership
be kept within their proper bounds....
Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 576 n.11 (1972), citing uith approval United
States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 316 (N.D. Ohio 1949), afl'd 341 U.S.
593 (1951). See Collison, supra note 17.
19 See Engbrecht v. Dairy Queen Co., 203 F. Supp. 714 (D. Kan. 1962).
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to application of the federal antitrust laws- or their state counterparts.2 '
Yet although the great majority of franchise contracts have deline-
ated a franchise as little more than an embellished license, revocable
practically at will, almost every serious commentator now concedes that
a franchisee obtains a far more substantial position, if not an actual prop-
erty right.22  Significantly, in the first two state enactments designed to
regulate franchising,m3 a broad definition was adopted, with specific pro-
vision banning the termination or failure to renew a franchise except
for good cause.24 The same limitation has been widely enacted in state
provisions to protect automobile dealers, - the dear implication of which
is to acknowledge that the franchisee obtains far more than a mere con-
tractual license, much in the nature of a status or a property right.Y
Since most of the current franchise litigation has arisen in the federal
courts under the antitrust laws, it is not surprising that at least some
pronunciation has emanated from that source. Not long ago, the Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals had occasion to observe that "we are in a
day and age in which the value of the nationally advertised franchise is
a matter of general recognition," the illegal destruction of which would
involve "implicit" damage ar And much more recently, the same court ex-
pressly recognized "the vested interest a franchisee builds in his busi-
20 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-31 (1970).
2 1 See, e.g., "Baby" FTC Act, MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 93A §§ 1-10 (Supp. 1971).
22 See, e.g., statement of John V. Buffington, General Counsel of the FTC, given January 27,
1970, before the Select Committee on Small Business, where he said that "franchisor's fre-
quently speak of their relationship with their franchisees as being one of trust and confidence.
It is truly a fiduciary relationship." 1970 Hearings, supra note 5 at -. See also Rosenfield,
"Big Brother" as a Fiduciary: Suing the Franchisor, 76 CAsE & Cos., July-August, 1971, at
38; Brown, Franchising-A Fiduciary Relationship, 49 TEx. L REV. 650 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Fiduciary).23 Franchise Investment Protection Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. App. 18252x (Supp.
1971); Franchise Practices Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. 56:10 (Supp. 1972). Sca Globe Liquor Co. v.
Four Rose Distillers Co., 281 A.2d 19 (DeL Super. 1971) holding unconstitutional the retro-
active application of a Delaware statute requiring distributorship renewal except for good
cause; contra, Ford Motor Co. v. Pace, 206 Tenn. 559, 571-75, 335 S.W.2d 360, 365-67(1960) (auto dealer statute); See Sept. 30, 1971, opinion of Arkansas Attorney General con-
string § 2 of Act 252 of 1971 (making it unlawful to charge on Arkansas franchise a royalty
fee "which is greater than the lowest royalty fee which it charges to any other of its franchisers
in the U.S.") to prohibit the entering of a "new-contract" charging "any greater royaly fee
than the lowest contemporaneously being charged in other states for similar franchses."24 See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. App. 18.252x, § 18(2)(i) (Supp. 1971). Cf. Alpha Distrib.
Co. of Cal. v. Jack Daniel Distillery, 454 F.2d 442 (9th Cir. 1972), where the court held thar,
absent anticompetitive motive or intent, exclusive distributorship that is dependent on best
efforts, is terminable only for cause, but where there is no ascertainable term, duration is for
reasonable time and thereafter terminable on reasonable notice.
2 5 See Brown, A Bill of Rights for Auto Dealers, 12 B.C. IND. & COM. L REv. 757, 758
n.5 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Bill of Rights]. See, e.g., MASS ANN. LAws ch. 93B, §
4 (3)(c) (Supp. 1971).
2 8 Bill of Rights, supra note 25, at 767, 801.
2 7 Fontana Aviation, Inc. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 432 F.2d 1080, 1086 (7th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971).
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ness through years of effort and expenditures. ' 28  In a leading case, the
court held that:
[I]n the economic context of present franchising trends, it is clear that a
franchise license is marketable, separate and apart from the various
products which the franchisees are required to purchase from and through
the franchisor.29
After extensive analysis of innumerable franchise sys:ems and the com-
posite of functions involved in the complex relationship, this author has
concluded that the property right obtained by a franchisee is in fact a
legal status, possibly open to description as a license coupled with an in-
terest.30 Although the law has had difficulty in settlirg on an exact def-
inition of various chattels real, such as a savings bank book, a bond, or
similar embodiment of a chose in action in a documentary form, the ulti-
mate significance lies in the attributes to which such a vested interest
may be entitled. While there is hardly agreement as to the minimum
characteristics which a franchise must provide, perhaps that can be better
discerned after the ensuing discussion of each of the elements which are
involved in many types of franchises.
It should be evident that this consideration of the very nature of a
franchise goes to the root of the question of misrepresentation. In ad-
vertising the franchise and even in the offering of . "franchise agree-
ment," the franchisor is implicitly representing that at least certain mini-
mum expert services and legal rights are being offered to the prospective
franchisee. If, in fact, the agreement reserves to the franchisor unrea-
sonable rights of abuse either in the operation, disposition, or destruction
of the capital asset, then fraud can be found. To those who profess
shocks, the proof may be found in the following discussion of the substan-
tial bundle of fundamental rights implicit in a franchise. The material
denigration of a minimum composite of those rights necessarily demon-
strates that a prospective franchisee has been actionably misled. Quite
simply, if a consumer purchases an automobile, it is essential that he re-
ceive a vehicle with certain minimum specifications. For the far more
crucial transaction involved in the acquisition of a franchise, frequently
2 8 Milsen Co. v. Southland Corp., 454 F.2d 363, 366 (7th Cir. 1971).
29 Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 847, 849 (N.D. Cal. 1970), a/I'd 448 E.2d
43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied 405 U.S. 955 (1972). In bankruptcy proceedings, it is
thus improbable that a franchise can be terminated as an "executory contract." Sea Bankruptcy
Act, § 313 (1), 11 U.S.C. § 713 (1) (1970). In United Artists Corp. v. Strand Productions, 216
F.2d 305 (9th Cir. 1954), in reorganization proceedings, a motion plture producer was not
allowed to terminate a license granted for the marketing of motion pktures. Earlier, it had
been held that in a publisher's bankruptcy proceeding, while recognizing a composer's equit-
able lien on a copyright, he was not allowed to ignore the publisher's common law proper right
in the copyright. Waterson, Berlin & Snyder Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 48 F.2d 704 (2d Cir.
1931).
30 See Piduciary, rupra note 22, at 660.
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representing the investment of one's life's savings, it would appear un-
conscionable to condone any less.
As to the generic rights being granted, at least in the case of the ma-
jor oil companies, the deceit may lie in their universal representation that
their dealers are lessees, rather than franchisees. In support of that spe-
cious claim, the oil companies note that no capital payment is required,
that dealers are only required to purchase about five thousand dollars of
tires, batteries, and accessories (TBA), and that upon termination or non-
renewal of the lease, their gasoline and related products are repurchased.
But such protestations are wholly inconsistent with the companies' li-
censing of their tradenames and their exercise of quality controls over
their use. Nor can they continue to pass themselves off as simple lessors
in view of their universal refusal to grant or renew a lease unless the
sales of the lessor's gasoline and TBA have been satisfactory.3 They
wholly ignore the dealer's goodwill.
Another basic factor is the full identification of the franchisor. When
the franchisor uses a wholly owned subsidiary or a sister corporation as
the contracting party, usually with undercapitalizationp2  as a shield
against unlimited liability, 3  deception appears to exist. Variations
of this problem arise when notable personalities with no actual affinity
lend their name to the franchisorlt a ploy clearly intended to lull the
prospect into a false sense of security. Although many franchisors have
erroneously claimed that the record of abuses is attributable to the usual
criminal fringe that can be found in any industry,3 it is of course true
that franchising has been a magnet for many criminal elements, bank-
3 1 FTC v. Texaco Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968). For discussion of other oil company nbu:.",
see Fiduciary, supra nowe 22, at 655-57.
3 2 Where the franchisor has insufficient capital to fulfill its representation of supprt sys-
tens for the franchisees, there may be implicit fraud. A similar question could arise where the
franchisor is either wholly or primarily dependent on the continuous sale of more franchises,
rather than on its ability to survive in a supervisory capadty.
33 For discussion of the newly developing concepts of "piercing the corporate veil," partc-
ularly where fraud is involved, see text accompanying notes 129-30, infra. As a sup:-..d de-
fense to such a remedy, a newly drafted franchise clause requirs the franchisee to foreswear
any future claim against the franchisor's parent corporation.
3 4 See Goodwin, The Name of the Franchising Game Is: The Franchising Fce, the Cc!c-
brity, or Basic Operations?, 25 Bus. LAW 1403 (1970); Amstar Corp., 3 TRADE IG. REP. 3
20,004 (F.T.C. 1972). See also Amstar Corp., 3 "TRADE REG. REP. 5 19,696 (F.T.C. 1971),
allegation of false advertising that national football and baseball leagues selected two brands
of sugar for superior quality and nutritional value, whereas endorsement was based on mon-e
tary consideration furnished to the leagues. For report of extensive criticism of the use of the
"trusted personality" in advertisements for the mail order sale of hospital insurance, :-- Wall
Street J., June 22, 1972, p. 38, coL 1.
3 5 See statement of IFA given in Washington, D.C., on February 15, 1972, to FTC hear-
ings officer on the FITC Proposed Trade Regulation on disclosure to prospective franchices.
For a key to the names of prominent franchisors that have allegedly been guilty of various
practices disclosed herein, see author's statement at the same hearings, given on February 16,
1972. The identically erroneous claim has been made to resist adoption of national cnsumer
fraud legislation. See Newberg, Federal Consurc Class Action Legislaroie Making the
System Work, 9 HARv. J. LEGIS. 217, 218-21 (1972).
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rupts, and renegades driven out of securities sales, installment land sales,
and insurance because of fraudulent practices. 6  While few would dis-
pute the propriety of required disclosure in such criminal reference, of
equal significance are those clauses giving the franchisor the right to as-
sign the contract at will and then to be relieved of all further liability
upon the assignee's assumption of the contract. 7
Closely related is the issue of the trademark license which goes to the
very heart of the franchise. Not only implicitly, but also in franchise
brochures and almost always in the franchise agreement, the franchisor
represents that it has developed substantial goodwill in the servicemark,
the protection of which is used as justification for many repressive prac-
tices. If, in fact, the mark is one in the public domain or newly adopted
or new in a particular territory, a basic misrepresentation could be pres-
ent. 8 More subtle is the case in which the license is limited to use with
a single product, such as chicken, or with a fractionalized service, such
as an employment agency solely for clerical employees. It may hardly be
apparent that the franchisor has plans to grant franchises under the same
tradename and in the same area, but for a different product such as roast
beef or, in the employment agency case, for blue collar workers and
even later for temporary services. The intention to dilute the value of
the trademark through fractionalization would appear to be a fact capable
of supporting a claim of misrepresentation.
In almost every franchise, site selection and control are of critical im-
portance. Included in the franchisor's advertised expertise is that of skill
in choosing a location. In fact, ordinary real estate services may be em-
ployed with the franchisor content to allow numerous franchisees to
gamble on the selections.3 9 Even where the franchisor assumes some
financial risk by signing the lease, the actual exposure for the brief period
of a potential vacancy hardly compares with the cash profit obtained
through the sale of the franchise. Site problems become more complex
when they involve control and profits. Many franchisors insist upon
leasing the premises directly, then subleasing them to the dealer at a sub-
36 See statement of New York Attorney General Lefkowitz to Committee on Franchise Li-
censing of the New York Legislature, Sept. 28, 1970. See also staff report on franchising sub-
mitted to the N.Y. Attorney General, released January 7, 1970, reprinted in H. BROWN, supra
note 12, at 194.
37 For lack of a more appropriate description, the author has characterized this as a '"com-
pulsory novation" clause, a concept comparable to Professor Williston's "weasel" clause. The
essentials of consideration are discussed in 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRAcTs § 102A (3d ed. 1957).
See Gill v. Richmond Coop. Ass'n, 309 Mass. 73, 79-80, 34 N.E.2d 509, 513 (1941) (plaintiffs'
promise to buy such milk as they might order is illusory and lacking in consideration).
3 8 See Lanham Act § 43, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1970). See also Star, The Consumer Class
Action, 49 B.U.L. REV. 211, 244-47 (1969).
39 See Barton's Candy Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 5 19,554, 19,609, 19,786 (F.T.C.
1971), consent order to cease and desist against franchisor's deceptive claims of survey and
electronic site analysis.
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stantial profit.4" Alternatively, the dealer must collaterally pledge its lease
to the franchisor. In each instance, the underlying purpose is to guaran-
tee that upon termination of the franchise for any reason, any goodwill
developed in the site will ultimately redound to the franchisor. Since it
would be difficult to claim that such an arrangement had not been dis-
closed, the complaint must be couched not merely in terms of the failure to
disclose the facts, but in the failure to explain the full significance of the ar-
rangement.
In fact, it would seem necessary to expose the reverse of such a situa-
tion where the franchise provides that it will automatically terminate if
for any reason the lease of the premises comes to an end. Aside from
such matters as nonpayment of rent, the lease may terminate without
fault, such as through a fire or a taking by eminent domain or merely
through the ending of the term of years. While such a defeasance clause
in the franchise would then become effective, such a calamitous forfei-
ture is hardly understood by the prospective franchisee, especially where
a substantial investment is required.
In a great majority of franchises, there are capital matters involving
the design, engineering, construction, or installation of a building, signs,
and equipment. Elements of deception may be involved in the alleged
expertise of the franchisor in each of such matters. Of equal importance,
the franchisor may obtain a "kick-back" from the third party vendor.
Such hidden benefits may trespass on express representations that the
franchisee will share in the benefits of mass purchasing power.41 Given
the revulsion toward "kick-backs," there may be a strong inclination on
the part of courts to find either active concealment or a duty of full dis-
closure.
Often such capital assets are leased, rather than sold, -to the franchisee,
much in the fashion of a sublease of the premises. Here, the problem
involves not only the extent of the profit, but also a question of mathe-
matics. For example, if the franchisor leases the premises with a rental of
five percent of gross sales, then subleases to the franchisee at six percent,
this can hardly be described as a "one percent add-on," a proper assess-
ment being an addition of twenty percent. Similarly, where equipment
is leased to the franchisee with a stated addition of seven percent of the
cost in order to cover the franchisor's investment, the putative rate of in-
terest on a direct reduction pay-out would in fact approximate double
that amount, or fourteen percent. Where the putative amortization is
calculated on a ten year basis, but the equipment has an actual life ex-
40 Such arrangements could involve a tying violation under the Sherman Act § 1, 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1970). FTC v. Texaco Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968).
41See Barton's Candy Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 55 19,554, 19,609, 19,786 (F.T.C.
1971), for a violation of the deceptive practices prohibition of the FTC Act § 5, 15 U.S.C.§ 45 (1970), arising from franchisor's failure to disclose "kickbacks" to prospective franchisees.
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pectancy of half that period, then the fact is that the franchisee will
have a double cash flow burden within, a predictable number of years.
Such financial outlay might well guarantee the failure of the dealership
within a foreseeable period. Although it must be conceded that it may
be impossible to explain such complex matters to a prospective fran-
chisee, particularly to those of limited business experience, such gross
disparity in intricate matters is in itself significant in the delineation of
legal duties.
Other complex factors involve availability and feasibility. For ex-
ample, if the particular franchise requires a location in a shopping mall,
the diminishing availability of such sites could be a crucial factor. Simi-
larly, if mortgage financing is required, the general diminution of such
funds or even the specific chilling resulting from the financial community's
disillusionment with franchising, could spell disaster for the prospective
franchisee. Both of these factors may be combined where the franchisor
advertises a "turnkey" 42 operation, while aware of the fact that provision
of such a facility is no longer feasible. Although such factors have been
accentuated during the recent recession, it would appear obvious that the
knowledgeable franchisor is wholly aware of such limitations, as com-
pared with the limited knowledge of the unsophisticated, prospective
franchisee. Even where the franchisor may not have expressly repre-
sented the availability of such assistance, it is in areas of such sophisti-
cated fraud that affirmative duties of disclosure may be requisite.
In the realm of competition emanating from the franchisor, there are
numerous practices which have the clear potential of destroying a pre-
viously granted franchise. Perhaps the most widely recognized system is
that known as dual distribution, a euphemism describing the practice of
distribution at the same market level and in the same market area through
comparty owned outlets and franchised units. To the general public, in-
cluding potential franchisees, such units are indistinguishable. In each
instance, however, the company unit enjoys innumerable competitive ad-
vantages and, in any necessitous situation, its preferential treatment can
imperil the very existence of the franchised unit. There are a number of
variations of such competition. In one, the franchisor may grant an ex-
cessive number of franchises in a particular market area. Even if the
situation may ultimately become stable, the interim dislocation may be
enough to destroy the originally granted franchise, particularly in a mar-
ginal case. Occasionally, the franchisor may unwillingly inherit a dual
franchise where a franchisee fails for independent causes or simply ter-
minates. 'While the resale of such a unit would stabilize the preexisting
42 1n a "turnkey" franchise, the franchisor undertakes to provide a complete business
package, ready for the franchisee to start operations. Both site approval and availability of
mortgage financing offer palatable excuses for endless delay, during which period the fran-
chisor may have the free use of the franchisee's substantial cash payment.
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situation, it is virtually impossible to determine whether the franchisor
is genuinely striving to dispose of the outlet on reasonable terms or is
secretly retaining it for purposes of market control. Quite independently
of the boiling controversy concerning the propriety of such practices un-
der antitrust principles 4 3 a more relevant question devolves from the
realm of the franchisor's representations at the time of granting the fran-
chise. Given the severity of such a competitive threat, it may well be that
the law must construe the grant of a franchise as an implicit representa-
tion that such a destructive practice does not exist. Alternatively it could
require not only a full disclosure of such franchisor practices, but also an
exposition of the full import of such competition sponsored by the very
franchisor that granted the franchise.
Closely related is the practice of recapturing franchises either for oper-
ation as a company store or for resale at a profit 4 4 Such recapturing can
be on the basis of voluntary acquisition or through the use of oppressive
tactics. For example, given the franchisor's almost universal access to the
franchisee's confidential business records, the franchisor can take advan-
tage of its position of trust to direct its reacquisition to the most success-
ful units or those in a concentrated area where economies of scale can be
facilitated. There may well be a record of harrassment and abuse in or-
der to depress the price at which a franchisee may be forcefully induced
to sell. Even if the individual franchisee is offered a fair price for the
going value of the specific franchise, there is implicit abuse of the fran-
chisees as a composite group since eventually the franchisor will have the
greatest benefit from the system as a whole, with the franchisees left with
the marginally successful units. While it might be thought that such a
program would be too devious for deliberate adoption by franchisors, it is
in fact a prevalent practice among many major franchisors.
Such a reacquisition policy may be abetted by a wide variety of con-
tract provisions whose meaning or purpose is obfuscated. For example,
a right of first refusal as against any bona fide third party offer may in
fact be crippled by a clause prohibiting public advertisement that the
franchise is for sale until after the franchisor has declined to purchase,
thus chilling any opportunity to obtain a fair market value. Or an express
option to purchase may provide an agreed formula that precludes fair valu-
ation, using such ruses as an inadequate factor for capitalization of aver-
4 3 Most of these practices are specifically prohibited in MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 93B, §- 1,
4(3) (K) (Supp. 1971). See Bill of Rights, supra note 25, at 804. In Rea v. Ford Motor Co.,
5 TRADE REG REP. 5 74,015 (W.D. Pa. May 27, 1972), an independent dealer recovered
$5.6 million from the factory because of the antitrust violation arising from the direct compet-
don of company owned stores. Wall Street J., May 30, 1972, p. 12, col. 2.
44 Oxenfeldt & Kelly, Will Successful Franchise Systems Ultimately Become Wholly.Owned
Chains?, 44 J. RETAING 69 (Winter 1968-69). According to franchisor's affidavit in a Pending
class antitrust suit, in the past three and one-half years, it has reacquired a total of 109 of its 250
franchises, apparently for subsequent resale at a profit. See In re International House of Pan-
cakes, 331 F. Supp. 556 (Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit. 1971).
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age net earnings or artificial charges to expense for the franchisee's puta-
tive salary or the use of an accelerated depreciabton formula. While
provision may be made to pay the fair market value of both capital and
inventory items, that may be confined to tangible property so that there
will be a total forfeiture of the franchisee's goodwill.
Whether affirmative representations or active concealment can be
found in the particular case, the unconscionability of such contractual
artifices would appear so obvious that the agreement itself would have
evidentiary value. Without reviewing the many other practices and con-
tractual terms that can be used to terminate a franchise, it may suffice to
note that any of these can also be abused to abet a policy of reacquisition.
Here again, the extremely unfair nature of such a program may well im-
port into the grant of a franchise an implied representation that such a
practice does not exist. Alternatively, it may evoke a broad requirement
of affirmative disclosure.
Possibly the most basic representation to every prospective franchisee,
either in express terms or by clear imputation from the use of the word
"franchise," is that the grantee will obtain "a business of your own." It
is not difficult to infer that such a colloquialism imports the concept of a
property interest, concededly an intangible, as well as the normal attri
butes of such a "vested interest."4 Without unduly straining the limits of
that legal concept, it would appear to include ownership of whatever good-
will the dealer develops, together with freedom to transfer it, subject
only to such reasonable approval by the franchisor as might be necessary
to protect the maintenance of quality control required under the Lanham
Act.40  Even so, given the alacrity of the franchisor to accept a wholly
new franchisee with "no experience required," there would appear little
room for umbrage in its right to approve a transferee. This is particular-
ly suspect because the franchisor is a direct competitor in the sale of fran-
chises.
Further, it may secretly use its right to approve transfers in order to
exact assent to unreasonable conditions. As will be seen, since it may
be practically impossible for a franchisee to comply with the numerous
standards imposed by the contract and, even more, in the manual of
operations, it would appear clearly unreasonable to condition the approv-
al of such a transfer on the franchisee's having complied with all such
provisions. Similarly, it Would appear unconscionable to condition the
approval on the franchisee's granting a general release, potentially for-
feiting valuable litigational rights.4 7
Even before reaching the ultimate disposition oE the franchise either
4 5 See note 28 supra.
46 See note 16 supra.
4 7 See note 13 supra. Equally reprehensible is a general releas, i -orporated into renewal
of short-term contracts.
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by sale or gift, that property right may be involved in some form of equity
financing or in borrowing with a pledge of all or part of the business as-
sets. The usual prohibition of all such activity would appear to be unre-
lated to the business or legal requirements of quality control. Although
it may be impossible to ignore the equitable or anticompetitive implica-
tions of many of such repressive practices,48 the crucial factor here is that
any such impugning of the franchisee's vested interest would appear to
ground an action of fraud emanating from the "business of your own"
representation.
Intimately involved with that concept is the question of the time dura-
tion of the franchise. While there are no legal standards as such, certain
customs have become established in some industries. For example, in
many of the older industries, such as in automobiles, gasoline stations, and
most manufacturers' distributorships, a one year term has been widely prev-
alent, though under recent criticism there has been some movement to
increase this to three to five year terms. In many of the more recent fran-
chises, particularly in fast-food and the service market, the terms have
widely been for ten to twenty years or more, frequently with options for
renewals. As previously adumbrated, however, the express representa-
tion in such "time" clauses may in fact lay the basis for deceit either
through devious contract terminology or through complex legal maneu-
vers.
For example, the gasoline dealership contract for one year may in
fact be tied to a supply contract giving either party the right to terminate
on thirty days' notice. Or there may be an equipment lease provid-
ing for the free loan of the tanks, pumps, and other capital assets, but
also being subject to cancellation on twenty-four hours' notice. In all
cases, with the dealer having devoted his life to the station, he is to-
tally at the mercy of the oil company at each lease renewal,4 ' it being
not unusual practice for the franchisor to grant one to three year leases
at the beginning, but to shift to six month or even three month leases
after the station has become fully established. In automobiles, as eco-
nomic abuse has accelerated, 0 the dealer's only chance for survival has
been through the consolidation of stores into larger and larger units,
thus grounding a policy of attrition, nonrenewals, and similar destruc-
tion of the dealerships.5 ' In one fast-food chain, it was alleged that a
48 See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) ,for a per se and-
trust violation in restraints on alienation.
4 9 FTC v. Texaco Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968).
50 See Bill of Rights, supra note 25, at 761-76.
51 Such a trend is apparent from the fact that of the 49,000 automobile dealerships in exs-
tence at the end of World War II, only 27,000 now survive, representing a net annual reduc.
tion of 1,000 dealerships. The author is personally aware of numerous instances in which an
auto factory has deliberately terminated or declined to renew small dealerships in favor of so-
called low-profit high volume distributorships.
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major corporation suddenly decided that franchising was no longer de-
sired, whereupon it declined to renew the thirty day leases for all 640 of
its franchisees."
Unfortunately, however, even those franchisors who have been ca-
joled by judicial53 and public criticism to extend the time period of
their dealerships should be fully aware that such time clauses contrib-
ute to the franchisee's false sense of security. It may be repeated that
since the standards of almost all franchises may be impossible to attain,
the franchisee may at all times be subject to termination. Whether the
supposed term is thus subject to self-destruction or burdened with illegal
conditions, the present issue is whether the very representation as to dura-
tion is implicitly deceptive.
If, as argued, the franchisee obtains a vested interest in his business,
the law will ultimately rule as a matter of public policy that in order to
prevent an unconscionable forfeiture, the franchise is not subject to any
"termination" or "failure to renew." Although the franchisee may be
subject to reasonable quality control, the alternative to the penalty of for-
feiture for noncompliance may be to permit a suit Eor damages or to re-
quire 'the franchisee's disposition of the business within a reasonable time
period, but with at least a fair opportunity to obtain its fair market
value.5
Perhaps this delineation of the more important capital aspects of a
franchise can serve a broader purpose in evaluating the price charged by
the franchisor for the acquisition of the franchise. While it is difficult
to declare that a franchisor is not free to charge whatever the traffic may
bear, the standards of misrepresentation may provide some fair limitations.
At the outer limit, if the franchise system is patently incapable of suc-
cess or if the franchisor has shown reckless or grossly negligent disregard
for such concerns, any capital charge would appear to be implicitly false.
In the great majority of cases, businessmen have chosen to franchise be-
cause of a lack of capital or in order to avoid the risk of a loss of capital.
While such self-interest may be obvious, perhaps the prospective fran-
chisee is entitled to a full disclosure of the franchisor's finances, particu-
larly those which are devoted to the franchise system.
Just as basic is the usual prescription of a royalty on gross sales as a
charge for the use of the franchise. If the percentage charge is excessive,
52See Battle v. Ralston Purina Co., No. 70-1878-F (C.D. lad., filed August 21, 1970)
(Jack-in-the-Box franchise).
53 See FTC v. Texaco Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968).
54 See FTC's complaint in Adolph Coors Co., 3 TRADE REG. RIP. 19,454 (F.T.C. 1971),
which was a proposed order detailing cancellation procedure for distributors, including 180
day notice with written reasons and granting distributor right to sell his interest to a third
party, subject only to manufacturer's reasonable right of approving third party's qualifications.
See 4so Noble v. McClatchey Newspapers, 5 TRADE REG. REP. 5 7?,,9'7 (N.D. C-1. April 10,
1972) (after termination, franchisor cannot restrain alienation of d hlp)
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it may preclude the franchisee's ability to remain in business. In any
case, the franchisor's primary concern becomes one of gross sales, while
the interest of the franchisee lies in his net profit. This fundamental
conflict of interest will also exist wherever the franchisor's prime concern
is the distribution of his product, as in the case of automobiles, gasoline,
farm machinery, or in a whole array of lesser industries in which fran-
chising is prevalent. While franchisors constantly harp on the need for
joint effort, they thus conceal or sublimate this adversary interest that
permeates every aspect of the relationship.
Although this litany of fraud in the capital arena can only be consid-
ered illustrative, it should unfold a vista of the variegated form such de-
ceit may take. While encouraging a more replete examination of the
scope of such fraud, it may aid in the further delineation of the charac-
teristics of a franchise in order to ground the area in which misrepresen-
tation may abound. For example, until -it is fully acknowledged that a,
franchisee has a vested property right, that interest cannot possibly ground
deceit in the franchisor's representations. At the same time, all of such
considerations should contribute to the evolution of standards both at
common law and in new regulation.
B. Operating Matters
Given the wide panorama of items in the sphere of operations, it is
understandably impossible to cover them all, together with the endless
variations in each. As a composite, each of these profit and expense items
is reflected in all representations concerning the profitability of the fran-
chise. The latter can be in the form of profit and loss projections, de-
scriptive phrases, or references to specific services of acute importance.
The very grant of a franchise is an implication that a profitable business
can be maintained. But more affirmatively, there is implicit the under-
standing that with the use of expertise the franchisor has formulated a
profitable business package, 5 that its expert services will be constantly
available as support systems for the franchisee, and that through their
cooperative effort the franchisor and franchisees will be able to do together
what neither could do alone. Indeed, a leading franchisor spokesman has
defined the "franchise relationship" as:
[B]asically, just doing together with a group of people what cannot be done
alone. That is from mass purchasing power, advertising, from uniform-
55 See Motel. Managers Training School, Inc. v. Mferryfield, 347 F.2d 27 (9th Cir. 1965)
(franchisor broke its "implied promise" that franchisee could legally sell training courses and
instruction through failure to fulfill necessary conditions precedent to franchisees obtaining
state license to conduct such a business). Sce also RESTATENENT OF CONTRACrS § 599(a)
(1932) (cf. Ilus. 3); 5 S. WILuSTON, CoNTRAcrs § 1293, at 3683 (1937 ed.).
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ity of product, uniformity of identification and distribution, and build-
ing the acceptance of a product across the country.50
It might also be noted that as a result of the puffing in much of the fran-
chise literature, a great deal of the conditioning of prospective franchisees
has occurred prior to the offering by a specific franchisor.5
Perhaps the most common of such misrepresentations is the canard
that as compared with the fifty percent or greater "failure rate" of inde-
pendent businessmen, the rate of franchisee failures is less than ten per-
cent. Although the source of that representation has been established
as mythical,58 it is still being employed by ethical authors.,0 The closest
approximation to any justification for such figures emanated from J. F.
Atkinson's study, Franchising: The Odds-on Favorite, tens of thousands
of copies of which have been distributed by the International Franchise
Association.60
As this author disclosed in his Congressional testimony,' that report
itself revealed that it was based on arbitrary exclusions and highly se-
lected, rather than random, testing. For example, auto dealers were left
out because their investment exceeded $100,000; this, in spite of the fact
that the number of such dealers has diminished from 49,000 at the end
of World War II to a present 27,000, disclosing a net annual loss of
over 1,000 dealers. Gas station dealers were excluded because they are
supposedly only lessees, thus ignoring the annual station loss of from
25o to 40% of the Nation's 225,000 dealers. Actual figures were then
obtained from highly selected firms whose reports were used just because
they were complete. Even more, the report did not reflect the innumerable
cases in which franchisors have hidden the "failures" by buying out at
grossly depressed prices, frequently less than 10%o of the original cash in-
vestment. 
2
Far more devastating was the criticism of Atkinson's study by the au-
thors of the SBA-sponsored report, The Economic Effects of Franchis-
56From statement of John Y. Brown, President of Kentucky Fried Chicken, January 20,
1970, 1970 Hearings, supra mote 5, at 192.
57 See note 4 supra. See alsol Note, "Corrective Advertising" Orders of the Federal Trade
Commission, 85 HARv. L. REV. 477, 493-94 (1971) for discussion of problems of "residual dc-
ception," wherein the effects of such misinformation continue long after the specific falsity has
ended.
5 8 Levy, So You Want to Run a Franchise, DUN'S RMvinW, January 1969, in which the
author established that no one could find the source of such statistics.
59 E.g. Olney, Beaten Path or Golden Highway, ELK MAGAZINE, January 1972, at 11.
60 Because of the on-going activity of the IFA, the FTC might vell consider the advisabil.
ity of a "corrective" order based on the extensive distribution of that book. The IFA has said
that it has terminated further distribution of the book. See discussion accompanying notes
61-67 infra.
01 See 1970 Hearings, supra note 13, at 3-4.
62 Id. at 3-4, 49-52 (including Mr. Atkinson's reactions to these contentions when presented
by the author to the Senate Subcommittee).
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ing.'3  It there appeared that Atkinson was comparing "failure rates"
with "turnovers." Since "turnovers" include the sale, transfer, or dosing
for any reason whatsoever,64 obviously the rate of "turnovers" would
far exceed the rate of "failures." But the second basis for the Atkinson
findings was a glaring misinterpretation of a 1967 Dun and Brad-
street report showing that "of the retail firms that fail," 667o fail within
five years,65 a statement quite different from Atkinson's report that this
showed that 66o of all independent businessmen failed within five
years.66 Such "grossly inaccurate data on failure rates" led to the express
recommendation that the IFA withdraw Atkinson's book from crculation
as it "would be very misleading to potential franchisees."O'
Most franchisors are more specific with regard to earnings potential,
ranging from the actual advertisement by a major oil company as to "the
high profit potential" of a specific station with an actual record of end-
less failures, to the dollar and cents, itemized profit and loss projections
offered by major auto factories 8 and numerous service franchisors. Focus-
ing on the trilogy of such typical projections, the SBA study noted
63 See note 7 supra.
64 The word "turnovee' even includes the transfer of an individual proprietorship to one's
own corporation.
10 FAmURE RECORD T-ROUGH 1969 (Dun & Bradstreet, 1969) at 7.
66 EcoNomac EFFECTS OF FRANCHISING, supra note 6, at 93-98.
67Id. at 66.
6 8 See legislative statement of Ontario Retail Gasoline Dealers Association given in Toronto,
Ontario, on January 18, 1971, quoting the May 1, 1970, newspaper advertisement of Texaco,
Inc. in the Windsor Star:.
This Texaco Service Station Could Be The Income Opportunity You've Been Looking
For!
This Texaco Station will offer an excellent opportunity for the man who wants to be
in business for himself and make a good income. Prime location. Our research indi-
cates strong profit potental. Only small investment required. (emphasis in the orig-
inal).
In fact, the record for that particular station showed the following-
Name of Time in
Lessee Date In Date Out Business
Denomme Dec., 1959
Wright Dec., 1959 may, 1960 5 Mo.
Indig May, 1960 Mar., 1963 34 mo.
Dingwall Apr., 1963 far., 1965 23 mo.
Plumb Mar., 1965 Apr., 1965 1 Mo.
Grouleau June, 1965 Apr., 1970 58 mom.
The last dealer is in bankruptcy.
The conclusion drawn by ORGA was:
Not only should the Federal Consumer and Corporate Affairs Department prosecute
for misleading advertising, but the lessees who were enticed to invest their life sav-
ings in this "DOG" of a station, should have the tight to sue the oil company for
triple damages, for their failure to disclose complete truthful information about
past and potential profit potential.
Id. As for the auto manufacturers, their income projections for "dealer development' dealers ca
hardly be defended against a record of far more than fifty percent in failures, often with re-
peated failures at the same location. Even worse, it has been charged that such failures are
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the natural tendency for potential franchisees . . . to interpret the small-
est income level to be a 'minimum expected,' the middle income to be
an 'average expected,' and the largest to be a 'maximum' expected.00
Based on figures from 67 fast food franchise systems, including many of
the large, better-known franchisors, the actual records showed that 72.5%
of the franchisees earned less than the minimum, 91.8% earned less than
the average, and 98.5% earned less than the maximum. In fact, the
franchisee's "family income," including a weekly average of 60 hours
of work for the owner, 35 hours for the owner's spouse and 25 hours for
each of his two children remained exceedingly low. In 1969, over 10%
were existing at a semi-poverty level of less than $5,000, and that over
25% made less than $10,000. 70  No one has been able to compute the
havoc among franchisees caused by the estimated failure of more than
50% of the fast food franchisors in 1970-71.71
As for the specific figures, entries, and footnote:; in such pro forma
statements, only a highly knowledgeable expert could begin to decipher
the caveats and pitfalls. In almost every instance, the exceptions and
qualifications, hidden in technical entries and displaced notes, are suf-
ficient to sap any genuine meaning from statements which are obviously
intended to lay the basis for an "investment judgment" by the prospec-
tive franchisee.72 But while such dissemblance may appear defensible,
-there can be no questioning of the use of a pro forma statement showing
weekly gross receipts of $5,000 when the highest record for a specific
location has averaged half that amount, with similar comment for gross
disparity in figures for rent, advertising, and other crucial entries. For
example, "salary expense" which fails to reflect the nonpayment of wages
to a prior franchisee's spouse and children, is plainly fraudulent. Equal-
the predictable result of factory pressure for market penetration regardless of effect on retal
profits. See Bill of Rights, supra note 25, at 770-71. See also $5.6 million verdict in Rea v.
Ford Motor Co., 5 TRADE RE(;. REP. 5 74,015 (W.D. Pa. May 27, 1972); Wall Street J., May
30, 1972, p. 12, col. 2 (primary charge against auto factory based on the theory that destructive
competitioa from such company dominated retail loss operations).
69 EcoNoMIc EFFECTS OF FRANcHISING, supra note 7, at 2.12-3; Barton's Candy Corp., 3
TRAIE REG. Rn,. 19,554 (F.T.C. 1971).
10 EcoNoMic EFFECTS OF FRANcHIsING, supra note 7, at 2-13, 5-2.
7 1Although this is the author's own approximation, see id. at 2-5, reporting that in the two
year period, 1969-1970, there were identified 54 fast-food franchise systems that failed, with the
comment that there may have been double or triple that number, it being impossible to meet
the challenge of locating non-existent firms. According to numerou. reports in Nation's Res-
taurant News, the number increased so severely in 1971 that such reports were no longer news-
worthy. A professional franchise consultant reported, "Some of my franchise system clients
turn up their toes so fast, I have difficulty keeping track of them." Id.
72 "In almost every instance, the franchise offering literature was either inadequate, mis-
leading, wholly lacking, or blatantly false as to material facts necessary to make an intelligent
investment decision." Statement by New York Attorney General Lefkowitz to Committee
on Franchise Licensing of the New York Legislature, Sept. 28, 1970. See also Staff Report on
Franchising to New York Attorney General, January 7, 1970, reprinted in H. BROWN, supra
note 12, at 191. While there has been a sharp increase in mail fraud prosecutions in fran.
chise sales, there is no record of prosecutions for larceny by false pretenses.
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ly deceptive are figures based on nonexistent pilot operations, on loca-
tions patently superior to those newly available or to other exceptional,
nonrecurring, or atypical factors. 73  But since financial statements are
only the digested compound of numerous operating items, it may be pro-
ductive to examine some of those principal elements.
Perhaps the widest area of concealment prevails in the realm of kick-
backs obtained by the franchisor from third party vendors, 4 as well as
in the exorbitant profit on products and services sold to the franchisees.
While "kickbacks" have been widely found in fast-food franchising, it is
erroneous to charge all such larceny to the newcomers when litigation has
fully established that even major oil companies indulged. As for ex-
orbitant profits on products which the franchisees are compelled to buy
from the franchisor, recent cases have disclosed a charge of $21.50 for a
spice package costing $3.00, a chicken dip for $7.45 that cost $2.0071
and $4.50 for a gallon of cherries costing $1.50.71 But such charges pale
by comparison with mark-ups allegedly as high as one thousand percent
for so-called "captive" repair parts which auto dealers must buy from
the factories in the so-called after-market.70  When all such concealed
payments are added to the initial capital charges and the customary roy-
alty either on gross sales or comparable formula, it may be marvelled that
the franchisee can survive at all. In far too many cases, such viability is
dependent on endless hours of work or outside supplemental activity,
with failure as the alternative.8 0 Regardless of the type of fraud on
which liability may be based, it is obviously in this area that the greatest
73 Throughout this text are illustrations of actual practices disclosed to the author. While
documentation has been attempted wherever possible, in many instances such proof is not
publicly available.
74 Barton's Candy Corp., 3 TRADi REG. REP. 5 19,554 (F.T.C. 1971).
75 See, e.g., Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 US. 357 (1965) (commissions obtained
from third party vendors of tires, batteries, and accessories); FTC v. Texaco Inc., 393 U.S. 223
(1968) (commissions from third party vendors prohibited even in absence of overt coerdon,
since the dominant economic power of the manufacturer is "inherently coerdve'); Simpson,
v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964); Shell Oil Co. v. FTC, 360 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967).
7GSee defendants deposition in Klinzing v. Shakey's Inc., 49 F.R.D. 32 (E.D. Wis 1970)
(notation of allowance of franchisor's counterclaim).
77 This allegation has been made in G & K Foods, Inc. v. Kentucky Fried Chicken, Inc,
No. 71-5 Civ. Ft. AL (W.D. Fla. 1972).
78 This allegation was made in an antitrust suit against Howard Johnson & Co.
79 This allegation has been made in the pending case of DiCostanzo v. Chrysler Corp., Civ.
No. 70-3331, (F-D. Pa., filed Dec. 3, 1970). In Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S.
562 (1972), the Supreme Court noted that spark plug manufacturers would sell original equip-
ment to auto factories at or below cost in order to benefit from the lucrative "after.market"
for replacements based on the almost universal practice of mechanics to use identical makes in
repair and maintenance work.
80 Personal reports to the author have disclosed that six and seven day workweeks, with
fifteen hour days, are practically standard in numerous franchise systems, especially in fast-food
restaurants, convenient food markets and gasoline service stations. In the latter, all major
oil companies vigorously press for 24 hour-7 day station openings, with the operator usually
having to handle the better part of the burden.
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damages occur. When considered in the light of the usual pro forma
financial statements, actual concealment could easily be found.
Fundamentally, the franchisor represents that it has formulated an
overall system which will function at least reasonably well under normal
circumstances, although many franchisors literally profess to have devel-
oped systems with superior performance probabilities. The composite
of such a package would clearly include purchasing, merchandising, ad-
vertising, sales, record keeping, maintenance, supply and all service mat-
ters. Perhaps the principal element would relate to the human factor,
based on the representation that "no experience is required," thus calling
for superior training, supervision, operating manuals, and expert services.
Any material deficiency in such factors would clearly satisfy the require-
ments of fraud, yet the fleeting quality of such intangible factors could
make the problem of proof almost insuperable for the individual fran-
chisee relying on his isolated experience.
Nevertheless, isolated factors may be amenable to objective testing.
For example, most franchisors require the allocation of specific funds for
advertising, usually based on a percentage of gross sales. Where the
franchisor handles such funds, particularly for national or regional pro-
grams, the author has urged that the franchisor should be strictly ac-
countable for its handling of the fund, barring its use for advertising for
more franchisees, or to subsidize executive salaries, or to cover miscella-
neous travel and personal expenses. Such practices would also appear to
ground a claim of misrepresentation at the very inception.
Comparably, if training procedures are brief, ill-conceived, and ad-
dressed to only ministerial matters, similar complaint is available. Su-
pervisors selected without regard to talent and experience, surveillance
that descends to bill collection as its principal function, and a manual of
operations copied from an outside system,-all such deficiencies may not
only destroy the system, but easily satisfy a fraud charge. Deficient
though they may be, it must be recognized that proof of their inadequacy
must in the first instance come from the very franchisee who is, by as-
sumption, wholly unknowledgeable. With no certifying authority or
other independent source of verification, proof can be virtually impos-
sible.
The more tangible matters will revolve about the actual products
which are provided for distribution in some franchise systems. Clearly
the franchisor must be answerable for any misrepresentation concerning
the design, engineering, manufacture, and functioning of the product,
its accessories, and repair parts. The simplicity of such an obvious truth
unfortunately conceals the almost universal fact that once the franchisee
has been entrapped into the system, he is virtually helpless to complain
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about product deficiency, perhaps the most talked about example being in
the automotive field."'
Closely related to the product itself are a whole array of anticompeti-
tive market practices such as resale price maintenance, territorial or cus-
tomer allocation, the quota system, full line forcing, tying sales, exdu-
sive supply, and boycott, the opportunity for each of which is especially
available in the franchise method of distribution. 2 Wholly aside from
a far-reaching groundswell of antitrust litigation to curb such abuses,
the very existence of any of such illegal activities would appear to ground
a claim of misrepresentation as to the system originally sold to the fran-
chiseeY51
As to each of these operating factors, it should be evident that fraud
-is hardly confined to inceptive misrepresentations, particularly when the
opportunity to trick or deceive the franchisee actually accelerates after
the local store becomes well established. For example, in spite of a whole
-array of decisions prohibiting the major oil companies from inducing their
dealers to purchase specified TBA, particularly through the tying pres-
s' See Bill of Rights, supra note 25, at 807-10.
82 The range of potential antitrust violations is quite extensive, with most of them based
on unlawful treatment of the franchisee. See Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642(1969) (liability through several corporate distribution levels for damages caused by price
discrimination); Former Enterprises v. United States Steel orp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969) (ex-
tension of credit as tying product); FTC v. Texaco nc, 393 U.S. 223 (1968) (use of dominant
economic power to encourage sale of one brand of tires, batteries, and accessories constitutes an
unfair method of competition, even if overt coercive practices are not employed); Perma, Life
Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968) (unclean hands no defense);
FrC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341 (1968) (price discrimination plan under which re-
tailers could not obtain same quantity discounts as wholesaler-retailer); Albrecht v. Herald
Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (fixing maximum prices as an illegal restraint of trade); United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn and Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (imposition of customer or terri-
torial restraints on alienation of goods purchased by dealers as per se violation); United States
v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967) (horizontal and vertical territorial limitations); FTC v.
Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966) (incipient violation by major manufacturer in requir-
ing preferential purchase of its goods by dealers); United States v. General Motors Corp., 384
U.S. 127 (1966) (combination of factory and dealers in restraint of trade); Atlantic Refining
Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965) (kickbacks obtained from third party vendor of tires, bar-
teries, and accessories); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959)
(limited boycott by wholesaler); Semmes Motors' Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197 (2d
Cir. 1970) (because of uniqueness of the franchise as an asset, issuance of temporary in-junction against termination of a franchise does not depend on franchisee's demonstration
of probable success in obtaining a permanent injunction); Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d
505 (2d Cir. 1964), petition for cert. dismissed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965) (franchisor's exclusive
supply arrangement might not be a per se violation when used narrowly to protect trademark);
Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Cal. 1970), afJ'd, 448 F.2d 43 (9th
Cir. 1971), except as to evaluation of license fee, cert. denicd, 405 U.S. 955 (1972) (fran.
chisor failed to carry burden of proving that specifications for a substitute for the tied product
would be too complex to be practical). See also proposed FTC complaint in Chock Full 0"
Nuts Corp., 3 TRADE REG REP. 5 19,846 (F.T.C. 1971) (fast-food franchise allegations of
resale price maintenance, tying sales, and exclusive supply).
SaBarton's Candy Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 55 19,554, 19,609, 19,786 (F.T.C. 1971)
(deception of prospective franchisees as to profitability, site selection, and equipment kick.
backs, together with resale price maintenance based on loss of fair trade exemptions by direct
competition).
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sure of a short term lease, 4 a major oil company inveigled an established
gasoline station operator to purchase twenty thousand dollars worth of
TBA so that he could supposedly obtain a fifteen percent commission as
a warehouseman for the oil company. Unfortunately, not a single sale
was made by the oil company to any other retailer, leaving the "ware-
houseman" with his entire inventory. Because it is reasonable to assume
that such tactics are not isolated, it could be shown that the major oil
company indulged in what should well be labelled a racket, let alone a
fraud.
In another illustration, some franchisors allow franchisees to acquire
a franchise with only a small deposit, the balance to be paid by transmit-
ting all of the gross sales to the franchisor, with the crediting of the en-
tire net profit toward the remainder of the franchise fee. If the fran-
chisee should be successful, then he is certain to reach an impasse for lack
of funds to pay his own income taxes. Although that incredible ploy
has been utilized by a major convenient food market franchisor as well
as by a large fast-food franchisor, the latter achieved the ultimate in
brazenry in accusing its hapless franchisee of grand larceny for failing
to ring in the funds which he needed in order to pay the government,
though it was obviously impossible for him to steal his own money.
Perhaps the worst pressure on a franchisee occurs when the very sys-
tem adopted by the franchisor constitutes a fraud on the ultimate cus-
tomer, with the franchisee compelled to follow the system for fear of
suffering a termination of the franchise. While diat very situation oc-
curred with an auto transmission franchisor, whose policy included such
programs as customer deception concerning the free reassembling of a
transmission if no sale were made, as well as nondisclosure that used
parts might be used for repairs,8 the plight of the franchisee was com-
pletely ignored.
Before closing this categorization of operating frauds, brief mention
should be made concerning so-called area franchisors, referring to those
to whom the franchisor has granted territorial rights to sell franchises to
others. In such an arrangement, the area franchisor is usually required
to have one of his own operating franchises and subscribes to a quota for
the sale of other franchises over a period of a few years. In most cases,
he may have some supervisory duties, and he shares in the income re-
84 See cases cited note 75 supra.
8 5Aamco Automatic Transmissions, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 55 19,283, 19,425 (F.T.C.
1971); H & R. Block, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 55 19,677, 19,883, 19,949 (F.T.C. 1972)
(prohibiting tax return preparation service from misrepresentations regarding reimbursement
of customers and legal representation in case of errors, together with vmauthorized use of cus.
tomer information). See also International Business Coordinators, Inc. v. Aamco Automatic Trans-
missions, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. 5 73,772 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (motion for summary judg.
meat denied, franchisee daiming that he was forced out of business because of his refusal to
engage in franchisor's deceptive businesspractices).
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ceived from his sub-franchisees. Although such area franchisors are usu-
ally considered part of the management team, they are frequently the ob-
ject of fraud by the franchisor.
Basically, they are no different from the middlemen in the so-called
"pyramid schemes," where there are usually several levels of distributor-
ships with the principal effort devoted to the sale of more sub-distributor-
ships and only incidentally to the warehousing of the product to meet the
needs of those in the lower echelons. It has now been widely acknowl-
edged that such programs are implicitly fraudulent because they rely on
an endless supply of subdistributors, whereas it is a mathematical cer-
tainty that the number of available purchasers will quickly be exhausted
and the whole scheme will thereupon collapse.,,
In substance, the area franchisor is in a similar position since it is im.-
plied that he will be able to sustain the program, whereas his chances
of success- are quite minimal. Upon failure to meet the quota, his invest-
ment and on-going income from previous sales are subject to forfeiture.
While a few area franchisors may have succeeded because they had the
necessary talent and because they entered the game at an early stage,
for the most part they have suffered grievous losses.
In each case, what has finally come to be recognized as an intricate
fraud in the area of pyramid sales67 would appear equally applicable to
the area franchisor. And it would appear that each of the categories of
fraud previously discussed with regard to franchisees, should apply to
area franchisors with equal or greater force. Because in most cases the
area franchisor would be jointly and severally liable to the franchisee for
fraud or other illegal acts, specifically including numerous antitrust viola-
tions, the area franchisor is exposed to extensive liability originating from
the franchisor, rather than from himself. Though somewhat novel, it
would seem that the franchisor should be answerable to the area fran-
chisor under an implicit representation that the area franchise is not the
progenitor of tortious liability to others. Regrettably, such pressures on
the area franchisor only serve to exacerbate his dissemblance of prospec-
tive franchisees.
8 See Securities Act of 1933, Release No. 5211, and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Re-
lease No. 9387, both released as a single document on November 30, 1972.
8 7 Florida Discount Centers, Inc. v. Antinori, 232 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1970); Commissioner of
Securities v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 485 P.2d 105 (Hawaii 1971). Sce al1o SEC Releases,
supra note 86, describing the method in which such pyramid sale and multi-level distribu-
tion schemes often constitute "implicit fraud." While some initial state effort to control
pyramiding was frustrated; see Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. v. King, 452 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Cir.
App. 1970) more than half the states are vigorously attacking it both through litigation (Mass-
achusetts v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., Suffolk Superior Court, Equity No. 93,783 (Mass. 1971)
(consent decree for restitution) and legislation, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 93, § 69 (Supp. 1971).
Iowa was the tenth state to bar pyramid sale schemes by statute (National Observer, December
4, 1971, p. 9, col. 1). See also Note, Dare to be Grcx, Inc.: A Care Study of Regdation of
Pyramid Sales Pldns, 33 OHIO ST. LJ. 676 (1972).
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C. Methods of Operation
Franchisors insist that they must retain quality control over products
and services not only to meet their legal obligations under the Lanham
Act on threat of losing their trademark,"' but also as a matter of economic
necessity in order to benefit the entire enterprise. It is therefore crucial
to understand the methods of operation that prevail in the particular
franchise system, in order to evaluate them under the rules governing
fraud and full disclosure.
Perhaps the universal common denominator revolves around record
keeping and inspection arrangements. These may range from merely
providing the franchisee with a set of books to maintain, with a modicum
of reporting to the franchisor, through a whole range of increasing inten-
sity. The franchisee may be compelled to use prescribed forms, to trans-
mit them periodically, to provide audited returns, to permit total in-
spection of all records, and to use cash registers with tamper-proof
mechanisms for "gross sales" totals and to submit to physical inspections
often without warning. The franchisor may offer to provide minimal or
complete bookkeeping and accounting services or the franchisees may be
compelled to subscribe to such services and to convey all records to the
franchisor. While access to such confidential data and operations may
import many other legal responsibilities, 9 the immediate concern is the
extent to which they either ground a fraud claim or constitute an integral
weapon for its perpetration.
While such information can legitimately be employed to assist the
franchisee in controlling his operations, particularly with the use of so-
phisticated computerized accounting services, it is also readily available
to police every aspect of the many matters of economic interest to the
franchisor. This would not only include such basic factors as "gross sales"
figures for use in computing the royalty, advertising contribution, and
lease add-on, all of which are usually prescribed as a percentage of gross
sales, but more particularly in support of the numerous anticompetitive
practices previously noted. This would include surveillance of prices
charged to customers, the identification of all vendors of products and
services together with the specific products, prices, and amounts pur-
chased; the identification of all customers, inventory records for new
products as well as accessories, replacements, and repair parts, advertis-
ing, and both general and specific profit and net worth data. Obviously,
such records can be crucial for policing of resale prices, tying sales, ter-
ritorial or customer restrictions, full line forcing, quotas, and other per se
88 See notes 17 and 18 supra.
89 MIsen Co. v. Southland Corp., 454 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1971) (record keeping ser-
vices may be primarily for the franchisor's benefit); see FidAciary, rupra note 22, at 655, sug.
gesting that access to intimate and confidential records may materially contribute to the rec.
ognition of the franchisor's fiduciary obligations.
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antitrust violations. The confidential information can also be abused in
connection with the franchisor's reacquisition program, its market re-
structuring,9 0  and even for direct competition with the franchisees
through company stores.9 In barest terms, such services can be used
simply as another tied product, possibly even at a saving for the fran-
chisee, though as a very profitable matter for the franchisor because of
its access to computer services.
Such records can also be used for bruising tactics. For example, un-
tilexposed in 1970, the Big Three auto factories used the prescribed prof-
it and loss forms to "prove" that auto dealers were making a profit on
the $6.50 per hour labor rate for which they were reimbursed by the
factories for warranty work 2-  Ultimately, independent studies showed
that dealers' costs ranged as high as $11.50 or more an hour and surveys
by the factories themselves ultimately proved that the dealers were cor-
rect. 3 In the raging controversy, it was hardly mentioned that the prof-
it and loss forms prescribed by the auto factories had apparently been de-
liberately designed to miscalculate the dealer's labor costs in favor of the
factory.
More recently, it has been alleged that one of the Big Three, as well
as a major convenient food market franchisor, have deliberately manipu-
lated their dealers' financial returns in order to terminate dealerships and
to confiscate the dealers' interest in the business. The auto factory has
allegedly done this by manipulating the values of new and used car in-
ventory of so-called minority interest dealers, in order to show that the
value of their stock equity has been wiped out 4  In the convenient mart
system, the process has been to devalue the dealer's inventory to such an
extent that it goes below the outstanding loan for which it is pledged as
security, thus purporting to allow the franchisor to declare a default and
to evict the franchisee on less than five minutes' notice.On
90 See Bill of Rights, supra note 25, at 768-69.
91 See EA._YREs, WHAT'S GOOD FOR GM, 129-30 (1970).
92 See Bill of Rights, supra note 25, at 761-63.
931d. at 761n.16.
9 1See, e.g., Di Costanzo v. Chrysler Corp., Civil No. 70-3331 (E.D. Pa., filed Dmc. 3,
1970).
95 The normal mortgage requirements of notice, public advertisement, public aucon, ac-
quisition by mortgagee, "chilling" of the bidding, and accounting for any surplus are com-
pletely foreign to franchise practices. See UCC requirements for foreclosure of security in-
terests in personal property, UNIFORii CO MMRiAL CODE § 9-504, particularly that "the
method, manner, time, place and terrafmust be commercially reasonable." See also Keene Lum-
ber Co. v. Leventhal, 165 F.2d 815 (Ist Cit. 1948) (tort of wrongful interference with ad-an.
tagous relations arising out of abuse in mortgage foreclosure). On a different tack, query
whether the self-help termination procedures of franchisors may be a denial of due process under
the fourteenth amendment. See Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (lack of
due process in wage garnishment prior to court hearing); Fuentes v. Shevin, - U.S. -, 92
S. Ct. -, 32 L Ed. 2d 556 (1972), which held unconstitutional a typical state repossession
law allowing forcible entry and taking, based solely on aeditor's statement of nonpaymenr, in
spite of debtor's claim of a meritorious defense. The decision also denied that there can be a con-
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Given the wide panorama of franchisor benefits available because of
such record systems, the usual franchisor representations concerning the
advantages accruing to the franchisee could easily be false. But, in any
case, such statements obviously are used to conceal the true import of
such record systems, particularly as a tool for illegal anticompetitive prac-
tices. 6 Because of the on-going abuse of such procedures, this should
also highlight the prevalence of fraudulent activity after the initial grant
of the franchise.
Perhaps the most effective control of franchisees emanates from the
terrifying impact of the mere threat of termination of the franchise.
While most franchisors require a capital payment for the franchise for its
profit value and as a source of capital, even in the absence of such uses,
the franchisee's investment would fulfill its prime function as the an-
chor for the threat of termination. While that investment may well rep-
resent the franchisee's life-savings or even family borrowing, a compa-
rable input derives from the "sweat" equity in the franchise where no
capital charge is made, but the franchisee devotes his time and effort to
develop his dealership. 7
By couching the franchise in terms of an embellished license, termi-
nable either at will, after a brief tenure, or for violation of a long list
of covenants veritably impossible to attain and conditions that are sub-
ject to the franchisor's subjective judgment, the franchisor almost always
has available the power to terminate the franchise. Just for basics, the
franchisor almost always reserves to his sole judgment such matters as
prices to the franchisees, a particularly vicious practice in the case of tied
products or services, all methods of operation as expounded either orally
or in the manual of operations from time to time, quotas or minimum
sales requirements, all advertising, maintenance, and refurbishing of the
premises; assignments, transfers, and renewals, and the grant of compet-
tractual waiver of constitutional rights when there is a gross imbalance of power between con-
tracting parties; see also Lapraese v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y.
1970); Note, Some Implications of Sniadach, 70 COLJM. L. REV. 942 (1970). See generally
Comment, Non-udicial Repossession-Reprisal in Need of Reform, 11 B.C. IND. & COM. L
REv. 435, 440-49 (1970); Brown, A Meaningful Opportunity to Be Heard, 46 ST. JOHN's L.
Rin. 25 (1971); Note, Lease Termination and the Use of Summary Dispossess Proceedings to
Terminate a Franchise, 33 OHIO ST. L.J. - (1972).
See reversal of summary finding for convenient food mart franchisor in "unlawful de-
tainer" (i.e. eviction) proceeding on ground that in spite of 15 year sublease with 30 day and 24
hour termination clauses, the required existence of a leasing relationship is a factual question to
be weighted as against the possibility of a different relationship between the franchisor and fran-
chisee, such as a partnership, or even the existence of the two relationships. Southland Corp.
v. Tumier, et al, App. Dept., Sup. Ct. Santa Clara County, No. 548 (Calif. 1972).
96 See note 89 supra.
97See text accompanying note 13 supra. For the administrative expediency involved in
diminishing the case load, the California Franchise Investment Act only includes franchises
where a capital fee is required. CAL. CORP. CODB § 31005 (Supp. 1972). This provides a
ready means of fully avoiding the impact of the statute and perhaps eliminating coverage
for over 60 percent of all franchisees, especially for the many product franchises where a capital
payment for the license is seldom required.
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ing dealerships either for operation as company stores or for sale to inde-
pendent dealers. As beneficial as some company regulations may be, far
too many are impossible to attain, such control often being buttressed
by an express covenant that the franchisee will at all times comply with
every federal, state, and local law. Some agreements still state that the
franchisor shall have the exclusive right to determine whether there has
been a default.
Upon such termination, the contract is almost always designed to as-
sure that the franchisee will suffer a loss of all or a major portion of his
equity and, universally, that his goodwill will be lostY8 Even beyond
that terrifying prospect, the contract usually contains an extensive cove-
nant barring the franchisee from competing and, in the great majority of
cases, conveying to the franchisor control over the site, the telephone
listings, and the customer lists. A variation of such terrorizing stems
from the frequent use of real or personal property mortgages as an aid
to the franchisee's acquisition or operation of the business. In every in-
stance, such major loans provide that they are subject to call on termina-
tion of the dealership, thus representing a capital threat not only to the
business, but to the franchisee's home as well. The huge deficiencies in
such loans are frequently used to induce a quick general release by the
franchisee99 or are then the subject of vigorous state court litigation de-
signed to defeat the franchisee's assertion of his litigational rights."'
It had usually been said that such power to terminate was seldom, if
ever, actually used except in extreme cases, but that the threat of termi-
nation, with dire repercussions, was sufficient to obtain total franchisee
suppliance. In fact, experience has shown that some franchisors capri-
ciously toss around such thirty day termination notices not only to dull
any incipient independence of a specific franchisee, but also to impress
all the other franchisees. Even worse, many individual dealerships are
terminated or not renewed solely to gratify an executive's whim, for nepo-
tism, or to dramatically increase the franchisor's gross sales or net prof-
its.1 1 As a final blow, the franchisor may just terminate all franchises
9 8 The vice of such capital threat, as well as any restraint on alienation of the franchise,
must be evaluated in light of the fact that franchisors are themselves direct competitors in the
sale and grant of franchises.
99See Virginia Impression Products Co. v. SCM Corp., 448 F.2d 262 (4th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied 405 U.S. 936 (1972), in which a terminated distributor who agreed to release with
its supplier sought a determination that the release should apply only to claims he intended
to release (exclusive of antitrust claims), on same principle that release did not apply to a
person not intended to be released. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401
U.S. 321, 336 (1971). See also Comment, Private Antitrust Actions: Limitations and Re-
leases, 13 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 308 (1971).
100 See Milsen Co. v. Southland Corp., 454 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1971); Brown, note 8 supra
(growing recognition of litigant's cash flow requirements emanating from first and fourteenth
amendments).
101 See further testimony of John Y. Brown, 1970 Hearings, supra note 5, at 193-96, pro-
viding relevant data on franchisor's greater net profit from reacquired stores than from fran-
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and function as a company chain. In the other direction, lesser penalty
systems involve fines, company supervisors installed involuntarily, but at
the franchisee's expense,102 or simply reward or harrassment in filling
orders or other servicing.
While that entire system, generically characterized as the termination
threat, has generally been treated in other contexts, it must also go to the
very heart of the fraud issue. Perhaps this may best be illustrated by the
statement of a leading franchisor comparing a store manager with a
franchisee: as for the manager, as soon as he would achieve competence,
he would either want a salary increase, a share of the business, or he
would leave for greener pastures; but as for the franchisee, not only had
he paid for the right to be a dealer, but he could never leave because he
could never come out whole.103  If the franchisee is thus consigned to a
status below that of an indentured servant, then almost all franchise sales
literature is grossly fraudulent.
Since friction is almost always to be found in franchising, there has
been a modest beginning to find reasonable means of resolution without
resort to the potential cataclysm represented by treble damage antitrust
litigation in behalf of a class, with damages running into many millions
of dollars. While such a noble effort needs encouragement, it is also sub-
ject to fraudulent misuse.
Rather than tolerate collective bargaining as a means toward equaliza-
tion of power,10 4 franchisors have sought to employ every "busting" strat-
egy borrowed from the field of labor relations, ranging from simple per.
suasion to company sponsored councils and from threatened termination
for the leaders'0 " to favored treatment for the sheep.Y°0 Misrepresenta-
tion of the purpose and efficacy of such procedures abounds in the litera-
chise royalties or sales of products. See also U.S. DEP'T OF COMMNIRCE, aIANCHISING IN THE
ECONOMY 1969-71 (1971).
10 2 See order prohibiting the franchisor's installation of such supervisors unless specifically
requested by the franchisee. In re International House of Pancakes, 331 F. Supp, 556 (ud,
Pan. Mult. Lit. 1971).
10 3 Statement of David Slater, President of Mutual Franchise Corp., Boston Globe, Feb.
18, 1970, at 68, cols. 1-8. He was further quoted, "One of the biggest strengths the fran.
chisor has over the franchisee is the problem of filing a suit under present law. The fran.
chisee can't sue-it costs too much." Id.
104 McGuire, The Labor Law Aspects of Franchising, 13 B.C. IND. & COM. L MtV. 215
(1971).
$105ee In re International House of Pancakes, 331 F. Supp. 556 (Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit.
1971), which involved a temporary injunction against termination of franchises based upon
franchisor's harrassment of leaders of dass litigation.
'06 A favorite method of controlling a successful franchisee is to adopt stringent conditions
for his qualifying to obtain additional franchises, coupled with t- r*Pherent threat of grant
ing a highly competitive sire to a stranger. See Perma Life Mi Inc. v. International
Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
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ture published by the "Big Three" auto factories 0 7 and is frequently the
subject of similar boasting by other franchisors.
Another ploy has been the promotion of arbitration as an established
businessman's method of avoiding disastrous litigation, particularly for
parties in a continuing relationship. In fact, although the strong public
policy behind enforcement of the antitrust laws 08 and the securities actsW1
has precluded the use of such arbitration clauses as a bar to court litiga-
tion, the countervailing policy favoring arbitration has been extended
even to cover the issue of fraud, at least where the contracting parties had
equal bargaining power.110
Unfortunately, the principal reason for such arbitration clauses has
been to forestall the franchisees' resort to class litigation, particularly un-
der the antitrust laws. The abuse of the arbitration process has some-
times been exacerbated by the franchisor's unilateral designation of the
arbitrator and by the usual provision that all arbitration is to take place
at the franchisor's home office or other designated location even though
it be thousands of miles removed from the franchisee's location.,
It may surprise some to know that such patent denial of simple due
process of law has been sponsored not by some fly-by-night newcomer,
but by the world's largest corporation in its relations with its more than
10,000 auto dealers. While seeking to hide under the cover that such
arbitration is binding on the company, but not on the dealer, the fran-
chisor selects and pays the arbitrator 12 and, until goaded into a recent
change, all proceedings were conducted at Kansas City, Missouri. The
gross impropriety of the franchisor's unilateral selection of the arbitra-
107 As to an auto dealer's "right of free association!' provided in a recently enacted Mass-
achusetts statute, see Bill of Rights, supra note 25, at 811-16.
108 A. & E. Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1968). See also Cobb v.
Network Cinema Corp., 5 TRADE REG. R P. 5 74,011 (N.D. Ga. March 1, 1972) (in anti.
trust claims arising from sale and operation of "Jerry Lewis Cinemas," franchisee must coa-
tinue arbitratioh where there was "voluntary submission" arising from his incipient partici-
pation and filing of a counterclaim).
109 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
110 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Afg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967) (binding at least
where contracting parties are of equal bargaining power). See also Monroe, Comnmercial
Arbitration: A Substitute for Franchise Contract Litigation?, 26 ARu. J. (n.s.) 147 (1971);
Lifflander, A Proposal for Change, 5 FAN. J. 43 (1972). But see enforcement ordered of
arbitration agreement for alleged violation of state antitrust law, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW. §
340, in Wunsch v. Benco Int'l Importing Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1972 Trade Cas.) 5
73,855 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 9, 1972). One of the most recent contracts excepts from arbitra-
tion the franchisor's claim for money, for eviction, or to protect the trademark; it also pre-
scribes a one year statute of limitations bar for all claims, instead of the four year statute for
federal antitrust claims.
"ll See Milsen Co. v. Southland Corp., 454 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1971) (critical comment on
such an arbitration clause).
"
2 See Bill of Rights, supra note 25, at 774-75. Cf. MiacCaulay, Changing a Continu-
ing Relationship Between a Large Corporation and Those Who Deal With It: Automobile
Manufacturers, Their Dealers, and the Legal System, 1965 WIS. L REv. 483 (Part 1), 740 (Part
II); Hewitt, Termination of Dealer Franchises and the Code--Mixing Classified and Coordinated
Uncertainty with Conflict, 22 BUtS. Lw. 1075 (1967).
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tor and of his payment by the franchisor is hardly offset by the "one-
way" arbitration, the company having declined even to answer an offer
of reversing the positions. Even worse, however, the arbitrator has never
considered any of the charges of flagrant antitrust abuses by the fran-
chisor. While dealers have been deliberately and fraudulently induced
to utilize that "arbitration" procedure rather than resort to court litiga-
tion, the company stoutly defends the fact that only one decision has ever
been rendered in favor of a franchisee 13 and that the present arbitrator
has never so ruled, the expressed reason having been simply stated, name-
ly, "General Motors is always right."
Lest it be thought that others are better, some reference must be made
to the supervisory system used by most franchisors for liaison control.
Aside from the absence of standards to select such men or to review their
decisions, recent disclosures showed a substantial rate of alcoholism, par-
ticularly at high levels in the automotive industry, with some district
managers being incoherent after their extended luncheons. The second
largest auto factory guarantees the result of all conferences between its
highly trained executives and the individual dealer by barring any talk
whatsoever if the dealer appears with his attorney.
The almost universal representation that the franchisor will support
the franchisee with specialists in every field of operation'14 can hardly
be squared with systems in which the franchisor is primarily concerned
with or even absolutely dependent upon, the sale of the franchises, rather
than the marketing of the franchisee's products. Many franchisees have
been dismayed to find that every request for expert assistance has con-
cluded with a substantial invoice for services rendered. When asked
why the bill should be so high for services of an almost repetitive nature,
the franchisors respond with references to their great expertise. In such
cases, the franchisee must pay to become a franchisee, pay a royalty to
continue as such, and pay a fee for each service rendered.
III. LEGAL CONCEPTS
A. Common Law
Given such pervasive factual illustrations of misrepresentation both
at the inception and during the franchise relationship, quite possibly the
classical rules of deceit would suffice, namely, the intentional misstate-
ment of a material fact on which reliance was meant and with damage
thereby caused. 115 Further, the extensive use of such a remedy is not like-
ly to have reached appellate reports, the issue being essentially a ques-
tion of fact. Nonetheless, since such recourse has apparently done little
113 Bill of Rights, supra note 25, at 774 n.50.
1 4 See H. BRowN, supra note 12, at 3-5.
115 See RESTATBMENT OF TORTS § 525 (1938).
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to control the excesses of the franchise industry, it would be worthwhile
to probe -the full extent of common law relief, while recognizing that
there is no uniformity in such state regulation.
With the critical importance of assurances in profit projections, it is
'pertinent to note that usually neither a mere promise nor opinion is ac-
ceptable as the factual subject matter of misrepresentation, unless it can
be shown that there was never an intention to perform, such an absence
of intent being considered factual.11 In some jurisdictions, however,
recovery may be had in a deceit action
by proof of a statement made as of the party's own knowledge, which is
false, provided the thing stated is not merely a matter of opinion, esti-
mate, or judgment, but is susceptible of actual knowledge; and in such
case it is not necessary to make any further proof of an actual intent to
deceive.' 17
Carrying that rule a step further, a New Hampshire court has ruled that
opinion misrepresentation is actionable where there is special knowledge
of complex matters." 8 Such rules would appear equally as far reaching
as liability premised on a reddess disregard for the truth or even negli-
gence in the ascertainment of the facts."" In such instances, both prom-
ises and projections would become actionable.
There has also been considerable pressure to find liability for nondis-
closure of material facts. At the half-way point, liability may be found
where there has been active concealment by some trickery to prevent
discovery of the .truth. 0 But it would be far more productive if an af-
firmative duty of disclosure could be established.'' In a case premised
on the gross disparity in the positions of the parties, a specialist was held
.16 See, e.g., Moran v. Levin, 318 Mass. 770,64 N.E. 2d 360 (1945).
"17 Chatham Furnace Co. v. Moffat, 147 Mass. 403, 404, 18 N.E. 168, 169 (1888); the
rile was most recently applied in Powell v. Rasmussen, 355 Mass. 117, 243 N.E.2d 167 (1969).
See also Yorke v. Taylor, 332 Mass. 368, 124 N.E.2d 912 (1955) (innocent misrepresentation
of assessed value of real estate is actionable, it being no defense that a buyer could easily have
checked at assessor's office); Sandier v. Elliott, 335 Mass. 576, 141 N.E.2d 367 (1957) (plain-
tiff's lack of diligence no defense to fraud in sale of franchise).
118 See, e.g., EnoBrick Corp. v. Barber-Greene Co., 109 N.IL 156, 245 A.2d 545 (1968).
19 Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 276 Cal. App. 2d 680, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1969) (where
magazine publicly represented its guarantee of advertiser's product, it would be liable even
though only guilty of negligence in its verification). Cf. Sherntob v. Shearson, Hammill &
Co., Inc., 448 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1971) (SEC Rule 10b.5 requires intent to defraud or reckess
disregard for the truth, and it is insufficient to allege mere negligence).120 See Maxwell v. Ratcliffe, 356 Mass. 560, 562-63, N.E.2d 250, 252 (1969); "Be-
cause the question of the dryness of the cellar had been raised expressly, there was special
obligation on the brokers to avoid half truths and to make disclosure at least of any facts
known to them or with respect to which they had been put on notice." Id.
12 1 See Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933) (corporate director not
liable to stockholder for misrepresentation in purchase of latter's stock through an exchange,
where stockholder sold stock on third party information that certain mineral exploration had
been terminated, whereas director in fact had the benefit of an expertes contrary opinion); cf.
A. BROMBERG, SEcu~rrms LAw: FRAUD, SEC RULE 10B-5 § 12.3 (1st ed. 1967) (Rule 10b-5
as a disdosure rule).
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liable for dishonest advice in his handling of the patents of an aged in-
ventor, the court ruling,
When confidence is reposed and accepted, the person trusted is liable for
expressing dishonest opinions upon which the other party relies and
acts to his damage, and he is also liable for concealing facts which
by reason of the relationship he should disclose.' 22
Such reasoning would seem applicable in most franchise situations, par-
ticularly at the inception.
Carrying that concept further, it has been urged that where there has
been abusive self-preference at the very beginning of the franchise rela-
tionship, a constructive fraud or quasi-fiduciary relationship can be found
in the gross imbalance in the positions of the parties in a complex mat-
ter where the franchisee not only reposes his confidence in and displays
a willingness to be guided by the franchisor, but the latter usually insists
on such a posture.' 2' In what has now been recognized as a classical
statement in this recently evolving area, it was said:
In redressing an abuse of trust and confidence equity will review such
factors as the relation of the parties prior to the incidents complained
of, the plaintiff's business capacity or lack of it contrasted with that of the
defendant, and the readiness of the plaintiff to follow the defendant's
guidance in complicated transactions wherein the defendant has special-
ized knowledge. Equity will, in sum, weigh whether unjust enrich-
meat results from the relationship.124
In the application of such concepts to franchising, an Ontario trial
court in fact held that such a quasi-fiduciary relation3hip did exist, requir-
ing the payment to the franchisees of the secret kickbacks obtained by
the franchisor from the third party vendors . 2  While affirming the pro-
priety of the equitable principles involved, the Ontario Supreme Court
reversed on the questionable ground that in the particular instance, the
necessary gross disparity of the parties was absent. Given the great com-
plexity in the economic misrepresentations involved in franchising,
coupled with the severity of the impact on the defrauded franchisee, there
would appear to be serious need to provide protection through such impo-
sition of an affirmative duty of disclosure, at least with regard to the areas
of most sensitivity to the innocent franchisee.
Closely related to the issue of fraud in the inducement is the trend to
122Reed v. A. E. Little Co., 256 Mass. 442, 449, 152 N.E. 918, 920-21 (1926); ScoTs,
TRusTs § 462.2 (1967); RESTATEMENT OF REsTTmr1O, § 201 (1937).
123 Broomfield v. Kosow, 349 Mass. 749, 755, 212 N.E.2d 556, 560 (1965); Meinhard v.
Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 467, 164 N.E. 545, 548 (1928); Pound, Progress ol the Law: Equity,
33 HARv L. REV. 420 (1920); See also Rosenfeld, Big Brother as a Fiduciary: Suing the Ftran.
chisor, CASE & COMMENT, July-Aug., 1971, at 38.
124 Broomfield v. Kosow, 349 Mass. 749, 755,212 N.E.2d 556, 560 (1965).
125 Jima Ltd. v. Mister Donut of Canada, Ltd., 13 D.L.R.3d 645 (1970) rev'd on other
grounds, 1 Karas Exec. Rep., No. 14, at 1 (1971).
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find implied covenants, conditions, or warranties in every agreement,
Professor Williston having simply declared that "in every contract there
exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing."' -" While
some courts have generally referred to these as necessary implications
from the expressed intent of the parties,2- others have emphatically de-
dared that
[ijn every contract there is an implied covenant that neither party will
do anything having the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the
other party to receive the fruits of the contract.128
Such concepts would not only dearly prohibit all fraud, trickery, and de-
ception after the inception of the franchise relationship, but would lay the
basis for an affirmative duty of full disclosure to prevent entrapment.
Of equal importance are various corollaries and procedural matters in
which the issue of fraud is or should be of primary consequence. One of
these involves the developing law on piercing the corporate veil, under
which it is possible to establish financial liability against a parent or re-
lated corporation, or even against the individual stockholders. Aside from
the antitrust cases, 119 such principles are supported where the corporation
is used as a mere agent, where there is general confusion as to the sepa-
ration of interest, but especially where there are elements of fraud in the
corporate maneuvers. 30
On the question of the burden of proof, possibly because fraud bad
many of the characteristics of moral turpitude, if not outright criminality,
some older cases appeared to indicate that the plaintiff had to satisfy
more than the preponderance of proof required in civil matters, a view
1 2 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1926 (1936).
127 See Motel Managers Training School, Inc. v. Merryfield, 347 F.2d 27 (th Cir. 1965)
(implied covenant of feasibility in sale of a franchise); G & K Foods, Inc. v. Kentucky Fried
Chicken, 71-5 FL r . (M.D. Fla. 1972) (implied convenant that franchisor won't compete with
franchisee); Burger v. Ray, 239 S.W. 257, 259 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922); Cheek v. Mezer,
116 Tex. 356, 363, 291 S.W. 860, 863 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927); ice also supra note 55.
128Lutz v. Bayberry, 148 N.Y.S.2d 762, 767 (Sup. Ct. 1956). Consequently, some courts
have prohibited dhe termination of a franchise before the franchisee has had an opportunity to
recoup his investment with a reasonable profit. See also Gibbs v. Bardahl Oil Co., 331 S.W.2d
614 (Mo. 1960); Beebe v. Columbia Axle Co., 233 Mo. App. 212, 117 S.W.2d 624 (1938).
129 In line with its declared policy of examining the economic realities in antitrust matters,
United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199, 208 (1968), the Su-
preme Court has experienced little difficulty in detecting unfair practices through several
levels of distribution, regardless of the degree of corporate ownership. Perkins v. Standard
Oil Co., 305 U.S. 642 (1969); Fison's Limited v. United States, 5 TRADE REG. REP. I 73,790
(7th Cir. 1971).130 See My Bread Baking Co. v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 353 Mass. 614, 619, 233 N.E.2d
748, 752 (1968). See generally Centmont Corp. v. Marsch, 68 F.2d 460, 464 (1st Cir. 1933),
cert. denied, 291 U.S. 680 (1934); The Willem Van Driel, Sr. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 252
F. 35 (4th CAr. 1918), cert. denied, 252 U.S. 584 (1920); EL BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS
§§ 136-38 (rev. ed. 1946); Douglas & Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through Subsidiary
Corporations, 39 YALE UJ. 193, 195-210 (1929); Comment, Alternative Aletkods of Piercing
the Corporate Veil in Contract and Tort Cases, 48 B.U.L REV. 123 (1968); Note Liabilhy of a
Corporation for Acts of a Subsidiary or Affiliate, 71 HARv. L REV. 1122 (1958).
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that had no judicial foundation and which is now being avowedly dis-
owned.131 In a recent class consumer fraud case, the California Supreme
Court keenly recognized the impropriety of requiring that the consumer
prove the falsity of the seller's representations, ruling that after the con-
sumer had satisfied the burden of coming forward with some proof of
misrepresentation, the seller would thereafter bear the burden of proving
the truth of its statements. 32 In fact, to the extent that courts may be
persuaded to accept the concept of a quasi-fiduciary relationship at the very
inception of the franchise and, even more clearly, where fiduciary duties
exist thereafter, the franchisor should bear the entire burden of proving
the fulfillment of his fiduciary obligations and the legitimacy of any
claim he alleges against the franchisee.133
Based not only on the franchisor's established superiority, possession,
and understanding of all the pertinent data, but also on its actual repre-
sentation of such expertise as the very justification for the franchising
relationship, it should bear both the burden of coming forward and the
burden of proof. If these duties appear onerous, their validity would
seem self-evident as compared with the imposition on the franchisee of
an obligation to prove a whole panorama of negatives, including such
matters as a showing that the franchisor's merchandising, training, site
location and managerial systems are deficient. To meet such a burden,
the franchisee would have to develop all the skills on which the fran-
chisor, itself, induced him to look to it for support. When a major oil
company advertises that "our research shows great profit potential for
this station," it appears reasonable to require that if. affirmatively justify
its statement. 34  And where the franchisor advertises for franchisees with
"no experience required," it would be offensive to common sense to re-
quire such a franchisee to disprove the honesty of the franchisor's ex-
press claims. It is not at all unfair that any doubt should be resolved
against the omnipotent franchisor, including his proving the propriety of
all financial transactions.' The latter would appear mandatory where
the franchisor actually maintains the franchisee's books of account or de-
prives the franchisee of essential information.
Intimately related to the burden of proof are all matters concerning the
ascertainment and amount of damages. Again, based on the special rela-
tionship in franchising, it would seem appropriate to strengthen the usual
common law concepts, perhaps under the guidance of rules governing the
131 See Rigor v. Bucd, 245 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1971).
132 Vasquez v. Super. C. of San Joaquin County, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr.
796 (1971).
133 Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 172, comment b at .177 (1959).
13 4 See legislative report of such an advertisement by Texaco, Inc., note 67 supra.
13 5 See Samia v. Central Oil Co., 339 Mass. 101, 128, 158 N.E.2d 469, 485 (1959) (cor-
porate .hrectors bear burden of proving propriety of their expense accounts); cf. A. SCoTr, HiA
THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 172, at 1399 (3d ed. 1967).
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very antitrust matters with which franchising is so intimately involved.
While precluding mere speculation, it would be sufficient to provide
computation based on reasonable calculations. 20 Although permitting
the franchisor to adduce countervailing explanations for such damages,
it should bear the burden of proof on such tangential defenses lest it
otherwise be allowed to benefit from its own malfeasance.1 17 Similarly,
if such pleas as contributory negligence, unclean hands, or equal guilt
are given any credence, the franchisor should not only sustain the usual
burden of proof for such affirmative defenses, but such matters should
only go toward the mitigation of damages. The restrictions on the ef-
fect of such defenses would not only be based on public policy, but
would also avoid the possible forfeiture of a substantial claim merely be-
cause of a minor defense that could be adequately recognized through
an offset of its value.138
The public policy behind these precepts should stem from the need
of strong deterrents against those practices which are employed by the
economically strong against those who are innocent and weak. Such
preventive measures would be lacking if those with extensive knowledge
and means could not only act in self-preference, but also face only the
possibility of having to return the loot if the individual franchisee should
be able to survive lengthy and expensive litigation at the very time that
he is least able to afford it. This very consideration was recently found
by the Seventh Circuit Court to be the source of irreparable damage
justifying a temporary injunction against termination of the franchisee's
business, lest he lose the financial cash flow to sustain the litigation a9
Because neither double nor treble nor other punitive damages are
generally allowable at common law, it is significant if the franchisor be
found in violation of a quasi-fiduciary or actual fiduciary obligation. In
either instance, the equitable jurisdiction of the court may be extended
far beyond the allowance of the damages directly attributable to the
fraud. Under established principles applicable to a fiduciary that indulges
in self-preference, the court may reject the allowance of all other com-
pensation no matter how reasonable it may independently have been. 4 0
36 See Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. 327 U.S. 251, 265 (1946) and an entire line
of cases devolving therefrom, discussed in Note, Private Treble Damage Antitrust Suits: Afes-
sure of Damages for Destruction of All or Part of a Business, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1566, 1572
(1967). See also Mfiller v. Commissioner, 333 F.2d 400 (8th Cir. 1964) (valuation of goodwill
a question of fact); Morton Bldgs. of Nebraska, Inc. v. Morton Bldgs. Inc., 333 F. Supp. 187
(D. Neb. 1971).
137 Id.
13 8 For comparable antitrust rule based on a weighing of similar equities, see Perma Life
Mufflers, Inc. v. Intel Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1968); Credit Bureau Reports, Inc.
v. Retail Credit Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. 5 73,813 (S.D. Te. 1971).
13O3 filsen Co. v. Southland Corp., 454 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1971). See Brown, A Mei-n-
ingful Opportunity to be Heard, 46 ST. JOHN's L REv. 25 (1971).
1 40 Under such Principles, in Broomfield v. Kosow, 349 Mass. 749, 212 N..2d 556
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For example, in addition to ordering the repayment of illegal kickbacks,
the court might disallow all royalties on gross sales.
As a further deterrent, such franchisors are confronted with newly de-
veloping procedural devices. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Proced-
ure, as well as in many States, the franchisees may now join their claims
in a class action, primarily where common questions of fact or law pre-
dominate.' While the maintenance of franchisee litigation as a class
action is now being more generously granted, 4 2 such progress has not
been free from all difficulty, particularly where aspects of fraud may be
involved. It has been stated that the propriety of a class action is doubt-
ful when misstatements are oral, 143 particularly where not made pursu-
ant to a common course of conduct and where the issue of reliance by
hundreds of plaintiffs might require separate hearings.144  Such a com-
mon nexus could be shown where the representation,,; were from a com-
mon source, such as in prospectus-type documents or where based on
nondisclosure coupled with an affirmative obligation to disclose.l16 But
(1965), the court disallowed the $10,000 fee which the trial court had found was reasonable
compensation for the lender-builder's efforts and went even further to assess interest on the
judgment at 15 percent per annum since the lender-builder had originally set that high rate of
interest.
141 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23, specifying the various conditions governing such class desig-
nation. Unless federal jurisdiction is acquired through pendent jurisdiction with claims under
federal law, diversity of citizenship is necessary and each claim must independently achieve
the jurisdictional amount of 10,000 dollars. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
142 After the first such case, Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Cal,
1967), it was four years before a series of other franchise cases obtained such classification,
namely Abercrombie v. Lurm's, Inc., C.A. No. 295-70A (E.D. Va. 1971); In re International
House of Pancakes Franchise Litigation, 331 F. Supp. 556 (W D. Mo. 1971); and Butkus v,
Chicken Unlimited Enterprises, Inc. 1971 TRADE CAS. 5 73,780, ( D. Il1. 1971).
In a recent acceleration of such decisions, there has been stl1 strntial cleavage in district
court treatment, with some courts recanting on previously granted certifications. Sc McCoy
v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. 5 73,873 (D. Neb. 1972) (grant of
class status in convenient food market franchise, subsequently suspended and now under re-
consideration); Gaines v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp. of America, 5 TRkDE REG, REP. 5 73,860
(N.D. Il1. 1972) (denial of class status to car rental franchisees on ground of insuflicient
numbers, lack of predominant questions of fact or law, and potential conflict of interest of a
former franchisee); Free World Foreign Cars, Inc. v. Alfa Romeo, S.P.A., 5 TRADE REG.
REP. 5 73,925 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (denial of class status where grant would have jeopardized
defendants' continued existence, with potential conflict of interest between former and existing
dealers). For sharp contrast with such treatment, see Sunrise Toyota Ltd. v. Toyota Motor
Co., Ltd., 5 TRADE REG. REP. 5 74,092 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (grant of class to auto dealers for
claims of unfair allottment and compulsory advertising contributions under Auto Dealers
Day in Court Act); Merit Motors, Inc. et al v. Chrysler Corporation, C.A. No. 2000-70 (D.
D.C. 1972) (order of July 11, 1972, granting class to auto dealers i. claim of price discrimi-
nation in sales of autos to major leasing companies); Seligson v. Plum Tree, Inc. et al, 5
TRADE REG. REP. 74,098 (ED. Pa. 1972) (grant of class to gift ,shop franchisees for anti.
trust claims with pointed criticism of conflict of interest theory); Lamb v. United Security Life
Co., 1972 CCH FED. SEC. L REP. 5 93,489 (D. Ia. 1972) (grant of class in security fraud
claim with superb discussion of numerous issues).
143 6 L LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 3947 (2d ed. Supp. 1969), cited with approval in
Morris v. Burchard, 51 F.R.D. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
144 Morris v. Burchard, 51 F.R.D. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
1451d.; Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 53 F.R.D. 216 (SD.NY. 1971).
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even where the claim is based on oral statements which are admittedly
made on many different occasions, such as in the sales talk to various
prospective franchisees, the court may well be convinced that such sales
talks are usually highly coached, based on a precise list of check-off items
and even learned by rote, thus forming a sufficient commonality to war-
rant class status. Based on such premises, together with the acknowledg-
ment that without the encouragement inherent in such a class grant the
rights might not be pursued, the California supreme court recently
granted class status in a case involving a scheme for selling refrigerators
and frozen food. 4 ; While many novel issues of manageability and in-
dividual proof can arise in class litigation, particularly where oral fraud
is involved, it is important to encourage such procedure as a matter of
public policy.'47 On one side, the opportunity for substantial recovery
may encourage able counsel to undertake such complex litigation on what
must of necessity be primarily a contingent fee basis. 148 At the same
time, that very exposure to general liability to the entire class of fran-
chisees, rather than to a few claimants, may provide the only ultimate an-
swer to the need for an effective deterrent.
For that very reason, franchisors have adopted extreme measures to
prevent the obtaining of such class status. In the first such successful
maneuver, when the application for class status came up for hearing, the
fast-food franchisor appeared with exclusionary requests by over ninety
percent of the franchisees, whereupon class status was denied."' No
record discloses the basis upon which such statements were procured. On
that precedent, other fast-food franchisors have shown comparable alac-
rity, over one hundred such exclusionary statements having been pro-
cured and filed in two separate suits'50 in both of which such highly
irregular activity has so far been ignored by the courts. One court has
nevertheless granted class status on all issues, including antitrust, fiduciary
obligations, and fraud. " ' A significant factor is the general prohibition
against the solicitation of members of the putative class by either party,
146 Vasquez v. Super. Ct. of San Joaquin County, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr.
796 (1971) (consumer fraud class suit based on oral sales talk "usually memorized").
147 See White, J. in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Calif., - U.S. -, 40 LW. 4246,
4250 (1972), in commenting on the district courts dismissal of staes class action as being
too unwieldy, but denying that such a suit could never be brought, "Rule 23 ... provides for
class actions which may enhance the efficacy of private actions by permitting citizens to com-
bine their limited resources to achieve a more powerful litigation posture." Id.
14840 U.S.L.W. at 4248. See Lamb v. United Security Life Co., (S.D. Ia. 1972) 1972
CCH FED. SEc L REP. 5 93,489 (grant of class status in security fraud case, including a su-
perb analysis of such issues as commonality, numerosity, conflict of interest, evideniary hear.
ing, and cost of notice).
14 9 Van Landingham v. Denny's Inc., CA. No. 69-424 (D. Ore., filed Nov. 7, 1969).
o50 In re Intl House of Pancakes, 331 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Mo. 1972); sce also G & K Foods,
Inc. v. Kentucky Fried Chicken, 71-5 Ft. M. ( D. Fl. 1971).
15 1 See In re Int'l House of Pancakes, 331 F. Supp. 556, (W.D. M1o. 1972); See also Mc-
Coy v. Convenient Food Mart. Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. 5 73,873 (D. Neb. 1972).
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either based on the local rule or the recommended order,152 including an
express caveat against any misrepresentation of the issues to the franchisees.
Given the complex nature of most franchise litigation, it is almost incon-
ceivable that a fair representation would be given by a highly involved
franchisor. In that frame, it cannot only be expected that the franchisor
would exert the full force of its superior economic power, but that it might
well distort the basic issues. For example, almost the entire franchise in-
dustry has been lecturing franchisees to avoid litigation at all costs because
it will necessarily destroy the entire system.
Finally, the place of any trial or arbitration hearing can be of crucial
concern to the franchisee, particularly if his dispute is being handled as
a singular, rather than class, proceeding. As earlier noted, public policy
precludes a contractual arbitration clause from foreclosing resort to a
court on antitrust or security matters, yet even the inclusion of fraud as
matter for arbitration will be binding, at least where the contracting par-
ties have equal footing. 53 Perhaps this discussion has established the
gross imbalance between the contracting parties sufficiently to convince
that the issue of fraud is not to be consigned to such arbitration. Fur-
ther, the usual requirement of a hearing at the franchisor's home office,
even though it be thousands of miles away, may itself establish such dis-
parity. 54
While reference has generally been made to the so-called long-arm
statutes under which a local state may obtain jurisdiction over a foreign
entity as to any transaction within the state, "5 5 in the most recent ruling,
such jurisdiction has been found to arise even where based solely on the
franchisor's "control" over the local distributorship.', Where the fran-
chisor attempts to abuse that statute by suing in the forum of its home
office, the court may be convinced that the forum is so inconvenient for
the franchisee, that it may well amount to a denial of due process because
of the franchisee's financial inability to litigate at such a distance. For
152See Manual for Complex and Muridistrict Litigation at 196-97, § 1.61, Suggested
Local Rule No. 7, and § 1.62, Sample Pretrial Order No. 15 (rev. ed. 1970). For temporary
injunction against franchise termination, see In re Int'l House of Pancakes, 331 F. Supp.
556 (W.D. Mo. 1972). See Weight Watchers of Philadelphia, Inc. v. Weight Watchers
Int'l, Inc. 455 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1972) (permitting buy-out discussions in presence of counsel).
Such proscription against communication makes a mockery of the suggestion by sonic courts
that class status should be denied because of the absence of intervention by other franchisees;
without knowledge of the suit, or perhaps depending on others to bear the burden while
they can avoid harrassment, active participation of other franchisees i. hardly to be expected.
153 See text accompanying note 130 supra.
154 For a sharp criticism of such a clause, see Milsen & Co. v. Southland Corp., 1971 TRADE
CAS. 5 73,774 (7th Cir. 1971).
155 See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 223A (Supp. 1971); §§ 1-9, Author's Practice Commen-
tary.
156 Fisons Ltd. v. United States, 5 TRADE REG. REP. 5 73,790 (7th Cir. 1972). Sco also
McCoy v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. 5 73,873 (D. Neb. 1972).
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that very reason, a court has recently declined to order the transfer of a
suit to a distant forum.157
B. Statutory Regulation
There have been numerous efforts to resolve the obvious need for re-
lief against fraud both through litigation l " and legislation, the latter be-
ing premised on the general erosion of such defenses as "seller's talk" or
"let the buyer beware" in order to protect those who are economically
weak,"'5 with a recent acceleration of such trends.Y0 Such efforts have
also been directed specifically at franchising both at the federal and state
levels and in existing and proposed regulations, the scope of which will
be briefly reviewed.
Of particular importance in the franchising context is the second as-
pect of the FTC Act declaring unlawful "unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices."'' While in the past this standard has been employed primarily
against deceptive advertising of products and services, it has recently
been invoked in franchising situations, with particular emphasis on decep-
tive advertising in the sale of franchises. 62  Premised on the same kind
157 Beach v. National Football League, 331 F. Supp. 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
158 With regard to the sale of improved realty by the builder.vendor, within the past decade
courts in many jurisdictions have expressly ended the application of "caveat emptor" (let the
buyer beware) by recognizing an implied warranty of fitness or habitability; see Theis v. Heuer,
280 N.E2d 300 (Ind. 1972), including a summary of such action across the country.
15 9 Most states protect consumers in complex matters such as insurance, mortgages, and in-
terest rates, often by prescribing the contracts or subjecting them to approval by regulatory
agencies.
160E.g., MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 93 (Supp. 1971); sce also such recent amendments as
those giving consumers an express cause of action for any violation (§§ 9, 10, adopted in
1969), and ch. 614 of the laws of 1972 granting such a direct cause of action to businessmen in
a new § 11. See also MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85 J; Acts 1971, Chapter 450, providing
that whoever sells personal property by deceit or fraud shall be liable to a purchaser in tort
for treble the amount of the damages sustained. Cf. the absence of a private right of action
for compensatory damages for violation of § 5 of the FrC Act, as construed in Carlson v.
Coca Cola Co., 318 F. Supp. 785, 786 (N.D. Cal. 1970), citing Moore v. New York Cotton
Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926), noting several Congressional proposals that would grant such
relief, e.g., S. 986 (92d Cong., 1st Sess.), which passed the Senate by a 76-to-2 vote, 544
TRADE REG. REP. 1 (1971) (FTC final order would be prerequisite to consumer suit). For a
penetrating analysis of the problems and shortcomings in such federal proposals, see New-
berg, Federal Consumer Class Action Legislation: Making the System Work, 9 HARv. J.
LEGIs. 217 (1972). Although two of the bills would confine relief to consumers, in a third
bill "consumer" would be defined to include anyone "who is offered a personal business or
moneymaking opportunity." Id. at 240 (commenting on the "Eckhrdt-Bayh" measure, HR.
5630, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), introduced by Representative Eckhardt on March 4,
1971; and S. 1378, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), introduced by Senator Bayh on March 24,
1971, as a companion bill to H.R. 5630, § 3(c)).
161 15 U.S.C. § 4 5(a)(1) (1970).
162AMeal or Snack System, Inc., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 5 18,671
(F.T.C. 1969) (consent order to cease and desist arising out of alleged misrepresentation in the
sale of fast-food franchises); Success Motivation Institute, Inc., 3 TRADE R G. REP. 5 19,306
(F.T.C. 1970) (consent order arising out of alleged misrepresentation in the sale of self-
improvement academy franchises); Universal Credit Acceptance Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP.
5 19,371 (FTC 1970) (complaint issued alleging misrepresentation in the sale of a credit
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of disclosure required under the Securities Acts, FTC Commissioner Mac-
Intyre has said,
Not only must the franchisor give [to a prospective franchisee] accurate
information about his franchise system, but ... he alo has the affirm-
ative duty to reveal any unfavorable news concerning the system. 103
While endorsing that view, the FTC General Counsel elaborated that
such "unfavorable news" includes "pending law suits or FTC actions, or
the fact that the franchisor competes in his own system."10 4  Unfortu-
nately, such obligations have been totally ignored and, in the absence of
a private right of action,' 65 franchisors have been subject to no effective
compulsion.
In a dramatic recognition of the broad scope of the power of the FTC
to enjoin "unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices," ' the Supreme Court has just ruled
that the Federal Trade Commission does not arrogate excessive power to
itself if, in measuring a practice against the elusive, but congressionally
mandated standard of fairness, it, like a court of equity, considers public
values beyond simply those enshrined in the letter or encompassed in
the spirit of the antitrust laws.167
Further, while declining to permit the substitution of a court's evaluation
for that of the FTC, Justice White there noted the standards which
the FTC itself has described as the factors it considers "in determining
whether a practice which is neither in violation of the antitrust laws nor
deceptive is nonetheless unfair,"1018 quoting the FTC as follows:
(1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been previously con-
sidered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by
card franchising plan); Century Brick Corp. of America, 3 TRADE REG. REP. 5 19,391
(FTC 1970) (consent order whereby franchisors of simulated brick and floor covering dis.
tributorships were prohibited from recruiting franchisees through misrepresentation).
163 Address by F.T.C. Commissioner Everett Maclntyre, Conference of International
Franchise Assn., May 8, 1969, 5 TRADE REG. REP. 5 50,240 (F.T.C. 1970).
184 451 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 6, 7 (1970).
165 See, e.g., Carlson v. Coca Cola Co., 318 F. Supp. 785 (N.D. Cal. 1970), citing Moore
v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926); cf. Farmington Dowel Prods. Co. v. For-
ster Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 61 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1003 (1967) (final FTC
order in antitrust ruling admissible as prima fade evidence of violation as provided in § 5(a)
of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1970). Purex Corp. v. Prccter and Gamble Co., 5
TRADE REG. REP. 5 73,782 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1065 (1972) (under
Finality Act, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1911) and § 5 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1971), FTC §
7 antimerger order, which merged into a final decree of a court of appeals, may be introduced
in subsequent private treble damage litigation to establish a rebuttable presumption of fact;
express reservation of whether underlying FTC record could also be used and whether same
would apply to FTC order that had not been merged into final court decree).
100 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970).
167 FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972); see also Comment, Sec-
tion 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act: A Source of Protection for Competitors and
Consumers, 12 B.C. IND. & COM. L REV. 982 (1971).
108FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
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statutes, the common law, or otherwise-whether, in other words, it is
within at least the penumbra of some common-law, statutory, or other
established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical,
oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to
consumers (or competitors or other businessmen). 60
Since the FTC is the administrative agency most familiar with the prob-
lems in franchising and has already displayed keen interest in eliminat-
ing all fraud and nondisclosure, as well as in the fostering of fair play,
with this square affirmation of the breadth of its powers it should now
go further to confirm the vested interest of the franchisee in his business
and the mutual obligations of good faith.
Possibly the simplest and most effective concept would be to con-
firm the mutually fiduciary nature of the relationship from its very in-
ception70 and to acknowledge that while the arrangement commences by
contract, a fiduciary status thereafter exists.' Such proposals are pend-
ing in Massachusetts,"1 2 Texas," 3  and elsewhere,17' and have been
adopted in Washington.'75 In the field of fraud, the obvious advantages
of such generic standards are the imposition of an affirmative duty of dis-
closure, the impact both at the inception and during the life of the rela-
tionship, the unlimited scope of the matters to which they apply, and the
established power of equity to fashion appropriate relief through a wide
variety of decrees including not only damages, but also mandatory and
injunctive orders, rescission,70 and reformation, all on both temporary and
permanent bases.
1&'9 d., from Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation Rule 403 (Unfair or
Deceptive Advertising and Labelling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of Smok-
ing), 29 Fed. Reg. 8355 (1964).
170 See note 150 supra.
171See note 55 supra.
'" Recently submitted as S.252 for consideration by the 1972 Massachusetts legislature,
also including registration proposals.
1 7 3 See proposed Franchise Association Act and Franchise Investment and Association Act,
each of which proposes to acknowledge the mutual fidudary obligations of the parties, with the
latter proposal also including the regulatory and registration provisions found in the California
Franchise Investment Law.
'
7 4 See Comment, Franchise Regulation An Appradse of Recent State Legislaton, 13
B.C. IND. & Com. L REv. 529 (1972); see also G. A. Pellitier and R. Strauser, Franchise Hand.
book 205 (P.I. No. 58, 1971).
175 See Franchise Investment Protection Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 18.252x § 18 (Supp.
1971) (as amended 1972, effective May 1, 1972) wherein § 18(1) specifies that "the parties
shall deal with each other in good faith," restrictions on termination are covered by § 18(2)(j),
and failure to renew the franchise is covered by § 18(2)(i). While granting some exemp
tions comparable to the California Franchise Investment Law, including an almost exact copy
of the filing and disclosure requirements for prospective franchisees, the Washington statute
also establishes numerous fair dealing requirements, especially a prohibition of the imposi-
tion "of any standard of conduct unless the person so doing can sustain the burden of prov-
ing such to be reasonable and necessary," in § 18(2)(h). Other provisions include the im-
position of up to treble damages, within the court's discretion, in § 19(3) and a limitation of
a defense to fraud to only those situations in which the franchisee "knew" the true facts,
in § 19(2).
17 In rescission, restoration of the parties to their prior status should include an allowance
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The second effort to secure generic relief has been through attempted
application of the broad anti-fraud standards of SEC Rule lob-5,17' pro-
hibiting anyone to use a "device, scheme, or artifice to defraud," to "make
an untrue statement of a material fact" or to omit a statement necessary
to avoid any misleading in a statement made, or to "engage in any act,
practice, or course of business" that would operate as a fraud 178 "in con-
nection with" 179 the purchase or sale of a security. Such standards would
not only recognize an affirmative duty of full disclosure, but even more
cogently, they would encompass statements of opinion, predictions, and
even promissory representations, most especially including forecasts of
profitability either in descriptive words or in pro forma profit and loss
statements, as well as unfounded offers of the franchisor's promised guid-
ance and assistance in all business matters. They would also require a
fair explanation of the significance of numerous complex business mat-
ters to the unsophisticated and inexperienced franchisee who may be
risking his entire life's savings on the intricate business venture being of-
fered by the knowledgeable franchisor. Legally, 'the investor would be
protected not only against intentional misrepresentations, but also against
any reckless or culpably negligent 80 failure to verify the facts.
As to whether a franchise is an investment contract of the character
covered by federal and state securities acts, much of the confusion arises
from a lack of judicial understanding of what is involved in franchising.
As distinguished from the simple sale of real estate or even of an inde-
pendent business, the grant of a franchise involves an investment of cap-
ital or time and effort in an on-going business relationship in which
there is a community of interest, with the franchisor not only retaining
the quality control needed under the Lanham Act, but also a whole array
of contractual and other power bases such as the unilateral right to pre-
scribe the franchisee's business methods and practices, the prices to the
franchisee, the advertising, the quotas, the manual of operations, all
structural and maintenance matters, capitalization, transferability, and re-
newals. As for the products manufactured by the franchisor and sold
to the franchisee, such as in the case of automobiles, gasoline, beer, or
hundreds of other items, the franchisor retains absolutely total power over
its design, engineering, manufacture, and provision of repair parts. Al-
to the franchisor for the use of the property, but also compensation for the franchisee during
the period of operation. See Runyan v. Pacific Air Ind., Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 304, 466 P.2d 682, 85
Cal. Rptr. 138 (1970).
177 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1971), adopted pursuant to Securities and Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970).
7 8 For the extreme breadth of such prohibitions, see A. BROMBERG, ScURITInS LAW:
FRAUD: SEC RULE 10B-5 (1st ed. 1968); L Loss, SEcUTurEs REGULATION (2d ed. 1961 and
1969 Supp.).
3-7 9 See Superintendent of Ins. of New York v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6
(1971).
180 See note 143 supra.
[Vol. 33
FRANCHISING
though franchisee suggestions may be received, because of the discipli-
nary prerogatives reserved and exercised by the franchisor, the views of
franchisees are most often treated with disdain. The franchisor not only
retains power to disenfranchise the dealer by denying him a sufficient
supply of inventory181 and parts, but the franchisee may be unable to con-
tinue in business with the products available to him only from other
sources,182 a debility of particular severity where the franchisor has di-
rectly restricted the franchisee's handling of other such products or has in-
directly accomplished the same result by requiring him to devote his en-
tire business activity to the operation of the franchise.
Because of the general lack of familiarity with the facts as well as the
law in such a dynamically developing business relationship, until re-
cently, the few district courts which have faced this issue have sustained
motions to dismissl based on a sterile application of the early Supreme
Court dictum prescribing that:
an investment contract for the purposes of the Securities Acts means a
contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a
common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of
the promoter or a third party.184
That very definition has been attacked on a number of grounds, most
recently on the basis that its underpinnings were unsound,1 85 aside from
the obvious fact that it was simply dictum and in spite of the court's ex-
press imprecation that the investment contract concept
embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of
adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those
who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits1 86
181 See JunikW- Imports, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. 5 73,911 (N.D. 11.
1972) (interpreting the good faith requirement of the Auto Dealers Day in Court Act to pro-
hibit a distributor from under supplying its dealer with vehides as a means of disenfranchising
the dealer).
182See Industrial Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Interchemical Corp., 437 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir.
1971) (after termination of dealership for line of industrial chemicals, dealer unable to sur-
vive financially with remaining lines).
183 Mir. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc, 324 F. Supp. 640 (D. Colo. 1970) aff'd and
modified 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972): Abercrombie v. Lures, Inc., CA. No. 295-70-A, order
of April 12, 1971 (ED. Va. 1971); McCoy v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc., 5 TRADE REG.
REP. 5 73,873 (D. Neb. 1972); G & K Foods, Inc. v. Kentucky Fried Chicken, No. 71-5 Civ.
Ft. Mf (MID. Fla. 1972); Cobb v. Network Cinema Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. 3 74,011
(N.D. Ga. 1972) (strict reliance on SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946)).
184SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946). In the absence of the fran-
chisee's active business participation, a franchise has been held to be an investment security.
Lennerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
185 See the scholarly analysis of the Howey antecedents in Long, An Attempt to Return
"Investment Contracts" to the fainstream of Securities Regulation, 24 OKM.! L REV, 135
(1971).
186 SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946); see forceful comment to like ef-
fect by Mr. Chief Justice Warren in Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967), quoting SEC
v. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344,351 (1943):
Novel, uncommon, or irregular devices, whatever they appear to be, are also reaced
19721
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In that very decision, the Supreme Court concluded with the clear warn-
ing that "The statutory policy of affording broad protection to investors
is not to be thwarted by unrealistic or irrelevant formulae. ' ' 187  Relying
on such standards, as well as the frequently repeated warning against
the allowance of a motion to dismiss, particularly in complex matters, un-
less it would be impossible to sustain a claim, at least one district court
has therefore refused to dismiss such a complaint, without a full factual
examination.188 Reviewers have been less reticent, very creditable argu-
ments having been made that the ministerial scope of discretion con-
signed to the franchisee as against the grossly disparate authority retained
by the franchisor, satisfies the test of "profits solely from the efforts" of
others."8" After meticulous examination of the judicial history and an
appraisal of the economic realities, other scholars have evolved new def-
initions that would include the franchise as an investment contract while
excluding the straight business transaction.9 0
Perhaps one of the more authoritative assaults on the "profits solely"
test has developed from the so-called "risk capital" test in which there has
been a partially appropriate result, though the theory is based on a con-
fusion of proof with a question of principle. Originally adopted by the
California Attorney General and then accepted by others,191 the conclu-
if it be proved as a matter of fact that they were widely offered or dealt in under
terms or courses of dealing which established their character in commerce as "in-
vestment contracts" or as "any interest or instrument commonly known as a 'securi-
ty-"'
Id. at 351.
187 328 U.S. at 301.
188 Beefy Trail Inc. v. Beefy King International, Inc., C.A. No. 70-246-ORL-CIV (M.D.
Fla. April 23, 1971). See also Phillips v. Magnetico International, Inc., No. 72-77-ORL-
CIV, Order of July 3, 1972 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (citing his identical conclusion in Beefy Trail,
Judge Young postponed any definitive ruling as to whether an exclusive territorial distributor.
ship for the sale of computerized beer controls was an "investment contract" under the state
and federal securities acts, until further development of the facts).
189 See Goodwin, Franchising in the Economy: The Franchise Agreement as a Security Un.
der Securities Acts, Including lOb-5 Considerations, 24 Bus. LAW. 1311 (1969); accord Com.
missioner of Sec. v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 485 P.2d 105 (Haw. 1971); Augustine &
Hrusoff, Franchise Regulation, 21 HAsT. L.J. 1347 (1970); Coleman, A Franchise Agree.
ment: Not a Security Under the Securities Act of 1933, 22 Bus. LAW. 493 (1967); Green,
The Regulation of Franchising Under the Securities Laws, 6 G. S. BJ. 357 (1970); Note,
Securities-Founder Purchase Contracts-"Contract" Defined, 21 MERCiER L. RE. 715 (1970).
19 0 See J. C. Longs superb work, supra note 185, at 174, concluding with:
A security is the investment of money or money's worth in the risk capital of a
venture with the expectation of some benefit to the investor where the investor
has no direct control over the investment or policy decisions of the venture.
See comparable definitions in Coffey, The Economic Realities of a 'Security': Is There a Moro
Meaningful Formula?, 18 WEsT. REs. L. REV. 367 (1967); Note, Franchising as a Security,
33 Omfo ST. L.J. 718 (1972).
19149 Op. ATr'Y GEN. (Cal). 124, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 5 70,747 (1967); Op. ATr'y GEiN.
(Ga.) No. 69-471, 3 BLUE SKY L. REp. 5 70,850 (Nov. 14, 1969); and Op. A'"Y" GEN,
(Utah), 3 BLUE SKY L REP. 5 70,893 (Jan. 7, 1971). The Call'ornia opinion relied heavily
on the case of Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 186 (1961), involving the purchase of memberships in an incipient c,.,untry club de-
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sion is based on the fact that when an entity is grossly undercapitalized
and then obtains its capital funds from others, including a direct or indi-
rect payment by a franchisee beyond the direct value of acquired tangi-
bles, then it follows that an investment must have been involved. Such
reasoning is reminiscent of the asset test in taxation matters, its applica-
tion in that arena being that if the taxpayer has extensive capital assets
without reasonable proof that they could have been acquired in his re-
ported income or from other explainable sources, then it must be assumed
that there was additional income which had not been reported. Although
the "risk capital" test is correct where applied, its rationale actually con-
firms the fundamental principle that all franchisors obtain capital from
their franchisees, whether that capital is the source of the original equity
in the franchisor or whether it is an accretion to existing capital.
It is submitted that the real difficulty arises from the failure of the
courts to have grasped the true nature of the franchising relationship
and even more so, the incredible extent of the fraud and opportunity for
fraud inherent in franchise practices, particularly in the original grant of
the franchise. The proof of this speculation lies in the curious develop-
ment under which "pyramid sale" schemes have more rapidly come under
judicial and legislative control even though the same legal and factual
arguments are even more applicable in franchising. 9"
Pressed by the mathematical conclusion that "pyramid" investors are
practically doomed to fail,'13 the severity of the fraud has finally induced
some courts to adopt a further alternative, referred to as the "economic
realities" test."' Under that test, the court held that an investment con-
tract exists where:
(1) An offeree furnishes initial value to an offeror, and
(2) a portion of this initial value is subjected to the risks of the enter-
prise, and
(3) the furnishing of the initial value is induced by the offeror's prom-
velopment which had no original capital, and in which the benefit to the putative investor
was not directly a matter of profit.
192 Iowa was the tenth state to bar pyramid sale schemes by statute. National Observer,
Dec. 4, 1971, p. 9, col. 1. See also Note, Dare to be Great, Inc.: A Case Study of Regulation
of Pyramid Sales Plans, 33 Omo ST. LJ. 676 (1972). In Oregon v. Consumer Business
System, Inc., 482 P.2d 549 (Ore. Ct. App. 1971) the court utilized the "risk capital" as an
alternate to the "profits solely" standard.
193 While the last cited case involved a so-called "founder.membership" contract in which
the putative investor sold discount membership cards, then received his income from a com-
mission on all purchases made by the member from the parent company, it does not mate-
rially differ from the "pyramid sale" scheme nor even from the "area franchise" arrange-
meat. In each instance, the implicit fraud arises from the fact that since the number of
prospects is limited, a reasonable opportunity for the investor to succeed would be mathe-
matically impossible. It is usually conceded that a few of the original investors may do well
until the market inexorably evaporates.
194 Commissioner of Sec. v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Ha. 642, 646, 485 P.2d 105,
109 (1971); lorida Discount Centers, Inc. v. Antinori, 232 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1971); contra,
Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. v. King, 452 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
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ises or representations which give rise to a reasonable understand-
ing that a valuable benefit of some kind, over and above the initial
value, will accrue to the offeree as a result of the operation of the
enterprise, and
(4) the offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical and actual
control over the managerial decisions of the enterprise.
Shortly thereafter, the Chairman of the SEC formally announced that
henceforward the Commission would not only apply the same "economic
realities" test and thus include "pyramid schemes" within the definition
of a security, but that thereafter a formal registration statement would be
required.'95
While it is perfectly obvious that the franchise format fully satisfies
these newly devised standards, in his formal release, the SEC Chairman
still hearkened to the "profits solely" test by stating that in the Commis-
sion's opinion, there is an offer of a security where "prospective partici-
pants are led to believe that they may profit from participation in these
distribution programs without actually assuming the significant functional
responsibilities that normally attend the operation of a franchise." His
seeming exclusion of franchising by that qualifying phrase runs contrary
to both fact and law.
In the very same formal release, the SEC Chairman directly quoted
the Hawaii decision's warning that
courts (might) become entrapped in polemics over the meaning of the
word 'solely' and fail to consider the more fundamental question
whether the statutory policy of affording broad plotection to investors
should be applied even to those situations where a,; investor is not in-
active, but participates to a limited degree in the operation of the busi.
ness.196
And in announcing that radical departure from the strictures of the
Howey case, the court went further to cite with approval a leading article
devoted to the thesis that both by contract and in practice, the franchisee's
scope of authority is so limited as to be essentially ministerial, sufficient
to bring it within the severe test of the Howey case.'
Rejecting the exclusive application of the Howey case, after a full
trial, a Colorado federal district court has held that an exclusive terri-
torial franchise for the sale of correspondence courses is an "investment
contract" within the definition of a security in the Colorado Licensing
and Practice Act. On the matter of control, the court ruled:
Plaintiffs had no actual control over the business that was being fran-
chised. Defendant could have refused to furnish course material to per-
195See Securities Act of 1933, Release No. 5211, and Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Release No. 9387, both released as a single document on November 30, 1971.
196 52 Ha. at 646,485 P.2d at 108 (emphasis supplied).
197 Goodwin, note 189 supra.
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sons to whom plaintiffs had made sales; defendant could have changed
the material sent to the students; and defendants could have, without
plaintiffs' approval or knowledge, gone out of business leaving plain-
tiffs without a product to sell.198
Obviously, almost every franchisor retains such controls as a bare mini-
mum, with far more pervasive power in most cases. As for the fraud in-
volved, the court found misrepresentations as to the length of time the
franchisor had been in business (three years instead of twelve years), the
record of performance (only eight franchises had been sold and none
had done the reported sales), the licensing of the educational courses
(Colorado had not granted a license), the calibre and experience of the
franchisor (not a "team of experienced personnel who had been success-
ful businessmen," but rather a one-man operation), and the franchisor's
initial support efforts (no intention to personally secure the first twenty
enrollments).
Noting that "a definite judicial trend is discernible which redefines
'investment contracts' in realistic economic terms rather than the narrow
interpretation indicated by the Howey case," the court noted with ap-
proval the principle enunciated by the Hawaii supreme court,
emphasiz[ing] the remedial purposes of that state's securities act, and
[holding] that participation on the part of an investor in a way which
is not controlling or decisive in the profit-making aspects of the busi-
ness would not deprive the investor of his relief.109
Applying such principles, the Colorado court held that the "initial value"
was furnished by the franchisee and "subjected to the risk of the enter-
prise," and on the alternatively crucial issue of control, that "the fran-
chisee did not have any supervision or control over the managerial deci-
sions of the business enterprise."20  Since that case is the first in the nation
to consider the basic issues after a plenary exposition of all the facts in
an actual trial, as compared with the sterile process in a motion to dis-
miss, such a considered judgment should carry much weight elsewhere.
The extent of the franchisor's pervasive control has been both judi-
cially and administratively acknowledged. In an FTC proceeding against
198 Venture Investment Co., Inc. v. Shaefer, C.A. No. C-2732--Order of June 15, 1972,
(D. Colo. 1972), applying the Colorado Licensing and Practice Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 125-1-12, 125-1-21 (1963).
19 9 See note 196 supr.
200 In a June 2, 1972, decision, the chief judge of an Oklahoma state court held that
the sale of "dealer and key dealer contracts" were sales of securities under the State statute
(Oi.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 2(1) (1965)), relying upon the fact that "the dealers have no
part in management... . The dealers had no voice in the policies of the corporations," not-
ing "it would make a mockery ... to den(y] investors the very protection they need when
confronted with a sophisticated and plausible scheme which promises profits in the future, but
with no assurance that there will ever be any sound economic basis for the generation of
profits or that the corporation will last long enough for the investor to even recover his
original investment, let alone any profit." State v. World Mkt. Centers of Okla, Inc. No.
CJ-72-1575 (Okla. County D. Ct. 1972).
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a major oil company charging that it received rebates from the suppliers
of tires, batteries, and accessories, with whom the gasoline station deal-
ers were induced to do business, there was admittedly no evidence of overt
compulsion by the franchisor.20 1 The United States Supreme Court
nonetheless found that control existed in view of the franchisor's power,
hinged on the short term subleases, coupled with the fact that the fran-
chisees were well aware of what was expected of them. In even more
direct language, the FTC held an automatic tranfmission franchisor li-
able for the false and deceptive advertising by its franchisees, based on
the fact that the advertising was designed by the franchisor and the fran-
chisees knew they could be terminated if they failed to obey the instruc-
tions of the franchisor. 0 2
There is thus created the anomalous situation in which a regulatory
agency with no particular expertise in franchising has enunciated new
standards which could clearly encompass franchising, together with a
wholly unfounded factual intimation that franchising may be beyond
the standards. The unexpressed reason for this patent abdication of the
rule of la,: lies in the administrative desire of the SEC not to be bur-
dened with the regulation of franchising, leaving that field to the Federal
Trade Commission. In addition to the work-load factor, the SEC has ac-
knowledged the expertise of the FTC in competitive regulatory matters.
That very position was publicly announced in the 1970 Congressional
testimony of Philip Loomis, then General Counsel, now a Commissioner,
of the SEC.2 3
It is, of course, erroneous to hold that the severity of the fraud or the
likelihood of the investor's failure should be the sole determinant of
whether there is an investment contract, though if such were the test,
then it can easily be demonstrated that many franchises are either de-
signed to fail or so recklessly conceived that the same result ensues. Sim-
ilarly, the "risk capital" test is merely a way to prove that venture capi-
tal was involved. Indeed, in one of the more recent assaults on the
"pyramid scheme," it has been held that the "risk capital" test should not be
limited to "initial capital," but "should also apply to schemes to raise capi-
tal for existing but unproven business as well as schemes to raise initial
capital. '2 4  Quite appropriately, the court so concluded, after it stated:
201 FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968).
20' ,AMCO Automatic Transmissions Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 5 19,283 (F.T.C. 1970)
- iADE REG. REP. 5 19,425 (F.T.C. 1970). See The Southland Corporation, 3 TRADE
REG. REP. 5 20,015 (F.T.C. 1972) (Proposed complaint against giant convenient food mar-
ket franchisor alleging its use of the purchasing power of the franchisees and the "stores"
division as a lever to procure reciprocal purchases from its "industrial chemicals" division).
20 3 See Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 640 (D. Colo. 1970) a/lld
and modified 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972) (holding that a franchise is not a security, rely-
ing stron ,ly on Mr. Loomis' quoted testimony. See 1970 Hearings, ncte 5 supra.
204 Idaho Com. of Fin. v. Glenn Turner Enterprises, Inc., Civ. No. 47773 (Idaho, Mar. 29,
1972'
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The unwary and gullible investor can be fleeced much more readily by the
older, more affluent company which has long been in business. A
money-short, small operation which is just attempting to get started,
probably would have more difficulty in extracting money from the naive.-
Properly viewed, while it is clear that the franchisee invests either
cash or his time and effort in the business enterprise, it is equally evi-
dent that the entire business remains under the essential control of the
franchisor both in law and in fact.20 6  Further, instead of there being
merely the sale of an income producing property or a business to the
franchisee, there is a continuity of income to the franchisor either
through a royalty on gross sales, rentals, or the sale of products or ser-
vices. This community of interest in the on-going business enterprise,
subject to the franchisor's control, provides the essential key to the rela-
tionship. Stated otherwise, the franchisee is induced to place his faith
and confidence in the business skills and expertise of the franchisor in a
complex undertaking of long duration, where the franchisee is expressly
lacking in experience. In substance, the very standards which would ap-
pear to create a fiduciary relationship would be of comparable signifi-
cance in establishing the transaction as a security. Of equal interest,
many of the same consequences would flow from both concepts, princi-
pally in the area of a duty of full disclosure and explanation, as well as
an absence of clandestine self-preference. In simplest terms, the invest-
ment contract involves the franchisee's acquisition of a share of the good-
will previously developed by the franchisor and the other franchisees in
the servicemark and logo, to which he will thereafter contribute his pro
rata share subject, however, to its total control by the franchisor. T7
Perhaps by way of anticlimax, it is quite probable that almost all
2O5Id.; see also Milsea v. Southland Corporation, 5 TRADE REG. REP. 73,774 (7th Cir.
1971) (recognizing "the vested interest a franchisee builds in his business through years of effort
and expenditures").206 In income tax litigation, it has consistently been held that the grant of a franchise is
not a "sale" because the franchisor retains a substantial degree of control Dairy Queen of
Oklahoma v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 503, (10th Cir. 1957); Moberg v. Commissioner, 310
F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1962); United States v. Werentin, 354 F.2d 757, 763 (8th Cir. 1965).2 0 7 See Kugler v. Aamco Automatic Transmissions, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. 73,986
(D. Afirm. 1971); aff'd 5 TRADE REG. REP. 5 73,978 (8th Cir. 1972). While holding that
the grant of a franchise and the franchisees compulsory contribution to national advertising
conducted were a single product, thus precluding an antitrust "tying" violation, the district
court stated:
What the franchisee expects to purchase is the right to use the trademark with all the
continuing goodwill and consumer recognition that goes with it. . . . What (the
franchisee] gains by becoming associated with the franchisor is the national goodwill
created by national advertising. If there were no national image there would be
little value to ownership of a franchise.
Id. at 5 73,186. Equally dear, the franchisor's complete control of such national advertising as
the very "essence of the license" establishes the economic reality of the franchisees acquisi-
tion of a standard "investment contract" fully controlled by the franchisor. See McCarthy,
Trademark Franchising and Anti-Trust: The Trouble uitb Tic-ins, 58 CAL. L REV. 1085,
1089 (1970).
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franchisees can obtain this very protection without a finding that the
franchise itself is a security. This arises from the statutory definition
which expressly includes a promissory note as a security,0 8 combined
with the fact that there is almost always a promissory note or other prom-
ise to pay money issued by the franchisee in connection with the grant of
the franchise. Since there is no requirement that such a note be negoti-
able, any promise to pay money will satisfy the standard even if there be
other specified conditions or executory promises of the parties. Just as
clearly, the protection of SEC Rule 10b-5 is available wherever there is
the purchase or sale of stock in the franchise corporation itself, be it but a
single share of stock in a one-man corporation.09 Of equally broad con-
sequence is the recent confirmation by the U.S. Supreme Court that the
protection of SEC Rule lob-5 is available wherever there is such fraud
"in connection with" the purchase or sale of a security, without any neces-
sity of showing that the fraud was perpetrated in such a transaction,
that there was privity, or that the damages flowed from it, the statutory
phrase "in connection with" being jurisdictional in nature, rather than
the governor of the fraud transaction.210
The third statutory approach has been special regulation requiring the
public filing of a whole array of specific data regarding almost every im-
portant aspect of the franchise, together with a requirement of presenta-
tion to a prospective franchisee and even a cooling-off period. The first
such statute became effective in California on January 1, 1971, specifically
requiring pertinent data as to financial, control, supply, and identifica-
tion information, as well as the public filing of a prospectus and the li-
censing of franchise salesmen.211  As compared with other proposals,
the California statute is considerably weakened by several provisions,
starting with coverage only where a capital fee is charged for the fran-
chise. Adopted as a device to alleviate the administrative burden, the
definition is wholly unrealistic and merely facilitates evasion.
208See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970), expressly defining such a promissory note as a "sc-
curity." While such a note is exempt from registration requirements if its due date is less
than nine months, the anti-fraud provisions of SEC Rule lOb-5 are in no way dependent
upon the necessity for registration.
209 As provided in SEC Rule 10b-5, it is unlawful "for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the malls, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange" to employ manipulative or deceptive devices,
such extensive jurisdiction arising not only wherever the mails are used, but also from the use
of the telephone, even an intrastate message being regarded as part of the interstate system.
See Lennerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Ohio 1964).210 See Superintendent of Ins. of New York v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 404 U.S.
6 (1971) allowing direct recovery by a creditor or a defrauded bank, thus stressing that "in
connection with" does not require privity, causation, or damages to flow directly from the
transaction, and citing with approval Lowenfels, The Demise of te Birnbaum Doctrine: ANew Era for Rule lob-5, 54 VA L REV. 268 (1968) suggesting precisely that broad scope of Its
applicability.
211 CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 31111, 31124 (West Supp. 1971).
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While large companies must give comparable information to pro-
spective franchisees, they are exempt from a public filing, perhaps the
first time in regulatory history that "bigness" has been equated with
"honesty." Further, a fraud claim can be defeated if the prospective
franchisee knew or should have known the truth, the first time that con-
tributory negligence has been made a defense to fraud.1  And, finally,
recovery is limited to the actual damages rather than providing for ex-
emplary, double, or treble damages, thus providing the weakest kind of
deterrent since, at worst, fraudulent franchisors need only fear the loss
of a portion of their booty. In sharp contrast, the recently enacted Wash-
ington statute has eliminated all of these shortcomings and, in an ad-
mirable desire to achieve as much uniformity as possible, the disclosure
requirements are verbatim with the California statute.2 13 In pending pro-
posals, other states and even the Province of Ontario have tried to adhere
to the same principle of uniformity.
For example, Wisconsin has recently enacted a "disclosure" type stat-
ute2 14 that is quite similar to the disclosure provisions of the Washing-
ton statute. While it lacks the deterrent of discretionary treble damages,
in addition to simple damages,21 5 it provides for enforcement by the
Commissioner of Securities,2 1  injunctions,2 17 and even criminal sanc-
tions. 21 Either as a matter of legislative necessity or because of effective
franchisor lobbying, there are exemptions from public filing for large
companies,219 as in the California and Washington statutes, though simi-
lar information must nevertheless be given to the prospective franchisee
at least 48 hours before the signing of the franchise agreement.'
Under the administrative rules for the Wisconsin statute, an attempt
has been made to specify the many areas in which affirmative disclosure
is acutely necessary, such as on matters involving profitability, the expe-
rience and financial strength of the franchisor, and the actual record of
2 12 See Yorke v. Taylor, 332 Mass. 368, 124 N.E.2d 912 (1955) (seller's innocent misrep-
resentation of assessed valuation of real estate is actionable and it is no defense that the buyer
could easily have verified the correct valuation at the Town Assessor's Office); Sandier v. El-
liott, 335 Mass. 576, 141 N.E.2d 367 (1957) (plaintiffs lack of diligence nor a defense to
fraud in the sale of a franchise).
213WASI-L REV. CODE ANN. § 19.100.010 (1972) (Washington Legislative Service, 1972,
ch. 116); see also note 175 supra.
214 WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 553.01-.78 (1972). (Wests Wisconsin egislative Service, 1972).
215 Id. § 553.51.
216 Id. § 553.71.
217 Id. § 553.54.
218 Id. § 553.52.
219 Id. § 553.22.
220 Id. § 553.22(3)(a)-(n). Reflecting the view that disclosure at that time is too late,
the proposed FTC regulation would require presentation "at the time when contact is first
established." F.T.C. Proposed Rule, 4 TRADE REG. REP. 5 38,029, § 436.1 (a) (F.T.C. 1972).
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other franchisees.' In the first subsection, the rules establish a presump-
tion of "false, fraudulent, or deceptive practice" in eighteen categories
of information if the franchisor fails to supply essential corroboration. "
For example, on the extremely sensitive issue of compulsory purchases
from designated vendors, there is a presumption of fraud if a represen-
tation is made regarding required purchases from specific sources "with-
out disclosure of the affiliation . . . between such sources and the fran-
chisor and the relationship of the prices . . . to the prevailing prices."-""
As to such crucial factors as the franchisor's role in training, site loca-
tion, and marketing, any representation is presumed to be fraudulent if it
fails to cite the contractual provisions, if any, which obligate the fran-
chisor to accomplish the same.114  Through such ;mplification of the
statutory proscription of fraud, the rules particularize the kind of infor-
mation needed for an intelligent decision. At the same time, they would
compel disclosure of illegal or reprehensible practices. It may not be
improper to presume that prospective franchisee:; elsewhere should
attempt to obtain the same information that is required to be given in
states which have enacted disclosure statutes. The same information
could be of importance in pending litigation. Finally, although such
statutes forego direct relief to franchisees for fraudulent or anticompeti-
tive practices after the grant of a franchise, the Wisconsin rules assign
a powerful administrative sanction to the Commissioner by enabling him
to issue a stop order or to revoke any registration where he finds that
the sale of a franchise "is or would be in violation" of the antitrust laws
or the Federal Trade Commission Act. 2  As for the materials which
must be disclosed, substantial uniformity is thus being achieved by many
States, simply as a matter of comity.
With that very standard in mind, recently filed bills"2  would express-
ly grant to the FTC power to prescribe by regulation certain categories
of information which franchisors must publicly file and present to pro-
spective franchisees, making failure a violation of § 5 of the FTC Act,
but also providing for the first time for private enforcement through an
action for violation of the deceptive practices prohibition, with treble
damages and counsel fees. Because of the intense apprehension of fran-
chisors that many states will enact differing versions of disclosure reg-
ulations, such proposals have been given excellent chance of enactment.
It is, nevertheless, fair to point out that the disclosure provisions
2 2 1Wis. STAT. ANN. § 34.01 et seq. (effective July 1, 1972).
2221d. § 34.02(1).
2 23Id. § 34.02(1)(b).
224 Id. § 34.02(l)(s).
225 Id. § 33.02.
226 S. 2399, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., introduced August 2, 1971, by Senator Williams, and S.
2870, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., introduced November 17, 1971, by Senator Hartke.
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are not identical with those enacted in California and Washington, and
that the federal act would be preemptive. By providing for a public
filing of the required information with the FTC, the legislation adopts
the advice given by the late Mr. Justice Brandeis that "sunlight is indeed
the best of disinfectants." 22 While the statute would not expressly re-
quire "good faith" and "fair dealing," the regulatory power of the FTC
would expressly encompass specific areas such as direct franchisor compe-
tition, unfairly induced sale of the franchise, and unprotected termina-
tion, cancellation or failure to renew the franchise.
Seeking to justify its focusing on misrepresentation in the sale of
franchises, FTC spokesmen have pointed out that in its recently com-
pleted study of franchising, eighty percent of the complaints received
from franchisees emphasized that they had not been told the full story
in advance, that many matters were erroneously described, and that they
had no genuine idea of what they were really getting into when they
acquired their dealerships. 28  In all probability, the same complaint
could be made by almost every franchisee, even those for whom matters
worked out well. It is, however, foolhardy to imply that the uninitiated
franchisee should be able to articulate the objections to the complex an-
titrust and unfair competitive practices of which so many franchisors are
guilty 229
Under its existing statutory authority, the FTC has initiated proceed-
ings for the promulgation of a Trade Regulation Rule concerning fran-
chising."s In substance, the proposed regulation would follow the same
general outline as the California Investment Law, specifying 27 particu-
lar areas of required information to be supplied to prospective fran-
chisees and to the Commission; prescribing the bases for certain financial
calculations and substantiation;231 and calling for various notices, a cool-
ing off period of ten days, express notice precluding negotiation in due
course of any promissory note unless free of franchisor involvement,
and express saving clauses for anticompetitive regulation under federal
or state law.232
2 27 L BRANDEIs, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY, AND How THE BANKERs UsE IT, at 92 (1914).
228 See THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FRANCHISiNG, supra note 7, especially ch. 5, "The
Operation of Fast Food Franchised Businesses" and ch. 8, "Commentary on Fast Food Franchise
Agreements," each of which contains extensive quotations from franchisees' letter comp!aints.
229 See Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. 5 73,784 (E.D. Pa. 1971); transfer
denied where nationwide conspiracy, id. at 5 73,796; allowed "nationwide conspiracy" amend-
ment in antitrust complaint in spite of plaintiff's factual ignorance, id. at 3 73,816.
230 Such formal notice was issued November 10, 1971, calling for public hearings February
14-16, 1972; see 4 TRADE REG. REP. 5 38,029, Proposed Rule Involving Disclosure Require-
ments and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising.
231 For general discussion of such FTC power, see Note, "Corrcetive Advertirsing" Orders
of the Federal Trade Commission, 85 HARv. L REv. 477 (1971).2 32 See Rosenfield, A Looh at the Proposed FTC Rule of Franchisirg, 27 Bus. LAw. 907
(1972).
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Although the specified list of information is somewhat different from
that prescribed in the California Investment Law, its scope and drafts-
manship are superior to that enactment. If promptly adopted, it will
fill the void for the well over forty states which have no such protection.
At the same time, it may avoid a patch-quilt of inconsistent regulations
across the nation that could seriously impede compliance. While viola-
tors would be subject to the normal sanctions available under the FTC Act,
it is open to serious question whether compliance can be obtained by a
simple cease and desist order after lengthy delays occasioned in part by
an overburdened staff, such "delay profit" for violators being a generic
problem for most FTC orders. 33 The basic shortcomings are the ab-
sence of specific statutory authority, preemptive right over conflicting
state regulations, power to obtain temporary injunctive relief, and, of
greatest consequence, private enforcement with treble damages. Since all
of these problems would be solved in pending legislation, 34 perhaps it
may be anticipated that Congressional action will follow the FTC pro-
ceedings for, without such basic sanctions, it is debatable whether it were
better to allow events to take their present course in litigation and a veri-
table surge of state enactments. In any event, for the time being no
further action is anticipated because the power of the FTC to issue any
industry-wide regulation has been successfully challenged in a district
court;2 35 promulgation of a general regulation on disclosure must there-
fore await appeal236 or specific legislative sanction.231
IV. CONCLUSION
For those who may complain that full disclosure would destroy the
very concept of franchising, no answer is genuinely required. For those
who may declare that the franchisee is seeking a guarantee of success
without hard work, this author has tried to formulate what it is fair to
expect when a franchise is granted:
Perhaps equity will at long last acknowledge the basic principle that
when a franchisor either sells or grants a franchise to which the fran-
chisee devotes his capital and labor, the franchisee is entitled to a reason-
able opportunity to succeed. This principle would require that the
franchisor perform its function of developing and maintaining a franchise
233 See supra note 231, at 482-84.
23 4 See note 266 supra.
235National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n. v. FTC, 5 TRADE REG. REP. 5 73,910 (D.D.C.
1972); FTC notice of appeal posted May 8, 1972, 21 TRADE REG. REP. 12 (1972) (successful
challenge to FTC authority to promulgate industry-wide trade reguk.tion on posting of gaso-
line octane ratings).
236 Id.
2 3 7 On April 19, 1972, at the meeting of the ABA Antitrust Sction in Washington, an
urgent plea for prompt remedial legislation was made by FTC Chairman Miles Kirkpatrick,
16 TRADE REG. REP. 6 (1972).
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system reasonably capable of fulfilling this implicit representation to the
prospective franchisee. Within reasonable limits it would impose re-
straints upon the capital charge for a franchise, the amount of the royalty
in the form of a percentage on gross sales, and all other charges, based
on the underlying requirement of a sufficient remainder for the franchisee
to obtain a fair return for his investment and effort. Although the
franchisee should not expect a guaranty of success, the franchisor should
be prepared to demonstrate reasonable proof of sound concepts and em-
pirical testing. While the franchisee should then expect to be subject to
the normal competition of the marketplace, he should be totally free
from both direct and indirect competition emanating from the very fran-
chisor from whom he acquired his business opportunity. Finally, sub-
ject to reasonable controls by the franchisor in the operation and dispo-
sition of the franchise, it must be recognized that the franchisee is the
owner of an independent business, entitled to the full protection of that
asset which the law affords to every other businessman.P 8
This long list of factual complaints, as well as an argument for the full-
est implementation of both substantive and procedural rules in order to
protect franchisees, might be sarcastically criticized as an over-reaction to
the abuses which have continued to this date. Yet if franchising is to
fulfill its national claim as the last frontier for the small businessman, it
certainly cannot establish such a foundation on fraud in any form. Prof-
it must be taken out of all such misrepresentation, regardless of the cost.
In fact there is ample proof that a legitimate joint venture can be main-
tained in franchising without resort to such abusive tactics. Those very as-
sumptions underlie all current legislative efforts.
23 8 See Fiduciary, supra note 22, at 674-75. Obviously, such protection would include the
anticompetidve prohibitions of the antitrust laws. fee note 82 supra.
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